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I. INTRODUCTION
A S AMERICA'S GRAND experiment with airline dereg-1 lulation nears the end of its first decade, European car-
riers and their governments are examining it closely,
pondering their own form of liberalization. Whatever its
final design, the European plan will require consideration
of a wider and more complex spectrum of variables than
its American counterpart.
Airline liberalization in Europe involves a plethora of
EEC AIR TRANSPORT
competing legal, economic and political interests.' The
principal actors include scores of privately and publicly
owned or subsidized airlines,2 the twelve nation European
Economic Community (EEC), and a number of air trans-
port associations including the Association of European
Airlines (AEA), the International Air Transport Associa-
tion (IATA), and the European Civil Aviation Conference
(ECAC). The issue is further complicated by a host of
bilateral agreements4 and a growing regional air transport
market.5
European nations, particularly those belonging to the
European Economic Community, are entering a new era
in air transport. While this industry has traditionally been
heavily regulated,6 many of the EEC states are reexamin-
ing their positions and moving toward liberalization of the
regulatory environment.
The EEC was established by the Treaty of Rome in
1957 for the purpose of enhancing economic efficiency
among the European states.7 The Treaty includes rules
intended to promote competition in various economic
sectors, including transportation.' The four governing
bodies of the EEC - the Council, the Commission, Par-
liament, and the European Court of Justice - share re-
I See generally Europe's Air Cartel, ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 1986, at 23 [hereinafter Air
Cartel]; P. DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 93-107,
241-55 (1987).
2 Air Cartel, supra note 1, at 23.
3 EEC Deregulation Proposal Blocked While ECAC Plan Proceeds, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., July 7, 1986, at 33.
4 See generally Naveau, Bilateralism Revisited in Europe, 10 AIR L. 85 (1985); P.
DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 47-75.
Feazel, EEC Officials Draft New Directive to Ease Regional Airline Regulation, Av.
WE. & SPACE TECH., April 14, 1986, at 37.
6 Feazel, New GATT Negotiations Could Give Impetus to Airline Deregulation, Av. WK.
& SPACE TECH., Sept. 8, 1986, at 58. For an overview of early international nego-
tiations for air rights, see Salacuse, The Little Prince and the Businessman: Conflicts and
Tensions in Public InternationalAir Law, 45J. AIR L. & CoM. 807 (1980); P. DEMPSEY,
supra note 1, at 7-22.
7 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
2, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. Salient provisions are set forth
in P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 451-59.
8 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 3.
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sponsibility to interpret and implement these rules.9
The Council, whose members represent the Member
States, is responsible for carrying out the objectives of the
EEC through legislative enactments.' 0 The Commission,
comprised of nonpartisan members chosen by common
agreement by the Member States, gives recommendations
and advisory opinions to the Council." Parliament works
for the benefit of the EEC as a whole and has the duty of
advising the Council on issues relevant to the develop-
ment of the EEC. 12 The Court of Justice interprets the
provisions of the Treaty of Rome and enforces its require-
ments. 3 Each of these governing bodies has its own con-
ception of how the competition rules of the Treaty of
Rome should be applied to air transport.
Significantly, in December 1987, the EEC Council is-
sued its long-awaited regulations applying the Treaty of
Rome's competition rules to scheduled air transport,
group exemptions thereto, a directive on scheduled air
fares, and a decision on capacity sharing and market ac-
cess. These are set forth as Appendices A - D, respec-
tively, to this article. With 1992 established as the target
for European economic unification, the heat is on to liber-
alize air transport.
The principal air transport organizations involved in
the liberalization process are the International Air Trans-
port Association, the European Civil Aviation Confer-
ence, and the Association of European Airlines. The
IATA represents more than 100 airline companies and is
one of the most influential airline organizations in the
world.' 4 The ECAC includes the directors general of
L. HENKEN, R. PUCH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1077
(1980) [hereinafter L. HENKEN].
10 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4401, 4405 (1987).
11 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4472, 4481 (1987).
12 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4302 (1987).
13 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4600 (1981).
14 Letter from Knut Hammarskjold, Office of the Director General, IATA to G.
Contogeorgis, Commissioner, European Economic Communities, Attachment A,
at 6 (Dec. 28, 1981) [hereinafter Letter from Knut Hammarskjold]; P. DEMPSEY,
supra note 1, at 269.
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twenty-two European countries and strongly influences
the European air transport policy.1 5 It issued two impor-
tant Memoranda of Understanding liberalizing intra-Eu-
ropean tariffs and capacity in December 1986. The AEA,
representing the thirteen largest scheduled airlines in Eu-
rope, promotes the interests of its members in the EEC
and in conferences concerning air transport policy. 1
6
While these organizations tend to favor more modest
forms of liberalization, their interests and objectives vary
greatly.
Britain and the Netherlands have led the fight for liber-
alization, concluding a number of liberal bilateral trans-
port agreements with other nations,' 7 while the more
conservative southern European nations, such as France
and Greece, have argued for a more modest relaxation of
the regulatory reins.'" New airlines, such as Ireland's Ry-
anair, are entering the market to take advantage of areas
which are amenable to competition. 19 Established air-
lines, including British Caledonian and British Airways,
advocate increased liberalization.2 0  Although there has
been a strong movement toward privatization in recent
years, many European airlines are still state-owned or
subsidized, complicating the ability of free market princi-
ples to work effectively.
This article will examine the contemporary status of
competition in the European air transport industry and
the efforts by the EEC, air transport organizations, and
individual states and airlines to encourage liberalization.
,5 Liberal Regulatory Environment Alters IATA's Fare-setting Role, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 11, 1985, at 102, 105 [hereinafter Liberal Regulatory Environment].
I,' European Airline Balance Shifts Toward Deregulation, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Nov. 4, 1985, at 29 [hereinafter European Airlines].
17 Feazel, European Civil Aviation Leaders Commit to Increased Liberalization, Av. WK.
& SPACE TECH., June 24, 1985, at 36 [hereinafter Increased Liberalization].
18 Id.; see also British Caledonian Reduces AEA Activity in Deregulation Dispute, Av. Wx.
& SPACE TECH., Oct. 7, 1985, at 36 (discussing attitudes of European airlines
toward deregulation) [hereinafter British Caledonian].
,1, Barrett, Irish Airline's Model for Deregulation, Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1986, at 35,
col. 4.
2o British Caledonian, supra note 18, at 36.
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The political, legal, and economic winds unleashed by the
debate over liberalization are creating increased turbu-
lence in the skies over Europe.
II. CONTEMPORARY PRACTICES IN EUROPEAN
AIR TRANSPORT
European airlines have traditionally been heavily regu-
lated by their governments. 2' Many European govern-
ments either fully own or subsidize their carriers. 22
National governments have traditionally shielded their
airlines from the rigors of the marketplace, perceiving the
industry to have public utility characteristics. Govern-
ments utilized air carriers to promote public policy objec-
tives beyond allocative efficiency, such as increasing
tourism and foreign exchange earnings, augmenting in-
ternational prestige, and enhancing national security, as
well as reducing domestic unemployment and promoting
domestic aircraft manufacturing industries.23
But after the United States deregulated its domestic air
21 See supra note 6. American aviation was also heavily regulated prior to 1978.
See P. DEMPSEY & W. THOMS, LAw & ECONOMIC REGULATION IN TRANSPORTATION
26-29, 121-133 (1986).
22 Percentage of capital held in 1979 by States in the main EEC scheduled air-










BULL. EUR. COMM. Supp. 35 (May 1979)(cited in Comment, Introducing Competition
to the European Economic Community Airline Industry, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 364, 365
n.7 (1985)). More recently, a number of European airlines have been partially or
wholly privatized. For example, British Airways has been completely privatized
and the Dutch government today holds only a 39% interest in KLM. See P. DEMP-
SEY, supra note 1, at 83.
25 Sorensen, Progress Towards the Development of a Community Air Transport Policy,
IATA MA., June-July 1985, at 3, 7-8; Dempsey, Turbulence in the "Open Skies": The
Deregulation of International Air Transport, 15 TRANSP. L.J. 305, 362-63 (1987) [here-
inafter Turbulence].
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transport market and began to export its ideology abroad,
many observers argued that rigid regulation and price-fix-
ing created inefficient markets and excessively high
fares.24 In 1983, unit operating costs of scheduled air-
lines in Europe were 70% higher than those in the United
States.25  The International Civil Aviation Organization
published figures which showed Europe as having the
most unfavorable revenue-cost ratio of twelve regions in
the world.2 6 Many fares in Europe remain substantially
above fares for comparable distances in other parts of the
world: "[I]t cost 166 [Pounds Sterling] to fly economy sin-
gle for 585 miles from London to Milan compared with
1 10 [Pounds] to travel a similar distance between Jakarta
and Singapore or 105 [Pounds] between Brisbane and
Canberra. ' 27 When reduced fares were available on Euro-
pean flights, they were usually encumbered by restrictions
and penalties.28 Capacity controls,29 tariff coordination
and price-fixing, 30 market access restrictions, 31 and reve-
,:" See, e.g., R. AMACHER, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 318-19 (2d ed. 1983).
For an examination of U.S. domestic airline deregulation and its exportation
abroad, see Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board - Opening Wide
the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91 (1979), and Dempsey, The International
Rate and Route Revolution in North Atlantic Passenger Transportation, 17 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 393 (1978).
11 Coor, InternationalAir Fares in Europe, IATA MAG., Jan.-Mar. 1985, at II [here-
inafter International Air Fares].
26 Commission of the European Communities, SCHEDULED PASSENGER AIR
FARES IN THE EEC (No. 398) 13 (Final 1981).
2- Thaine, The Way Ahead from Memo 2: The Need for More Competition and a Better
Deal for Europe, 10 AIR L. 90 (1985).
2' Id.
29 Capacity is defined as the total available aircraft seats on given air routes over
a given period, usually expressed in terms of available-seat/kilometers. The ca-
pacity controls are concluded in agreements between airlines which fix the
number of seats that aircraft from two different Member States will offer. Analysis
by the Council of Europe, Committee on Economic Affairs and Development of U.S. Deregula-
tion of Air Transport and Its Inferences for a More Liberal Air Transport Policy in Europe,
May 21, 1984, at 79; Commission of the European Communities, CIVIL AVIATION
MEMORANDUM No. 2, PROGRESS TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY AIR
TRANSPORT POLICY 32-33 (1984) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM 2].
- Price controls are prices imposed by governments in an effort to guarantee
revenues and enhance the viability of airlines.
1, Market access restrictions are agreements to determine which airlines will be
1988]
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nue sharing (pooling) agreements 32 allegedly contributed
to this disparity. 33
III. AIR TRANSPORT ORGANIZATIONS
Air transport organizations wield tremendous influence
in the European air transport industry.3 4 Although the in-
terests and objectives of each organization differ, growing
support exists for liberalization of European air transport.
The IATA perceives a relaxation of regulatory controls
as inevitable 35 and has recently shifted toward partial sup-
port of liberalization.3 6 In response to the pressure to lib-
eralize, the IATA has already adopted some structural
changes within its Tariff Conferences that make it easier
to experiment with new fares and services.3 7 The IATA's
absolute power has diminished, but it still serves an im-
portant function in coordinating carrier tariffs.
The ECAC, representing 22 European States, makes
recommendations and resolutions which are considered
and often implemented as regulations by its members.3 8
The ECAC unanimously issued a policy statement com-
mitting member governments to increasingly liberal regu-
latory schemes throughout the continent.3 9  The
proposed policy includes more flexibility in fare-setting,
market entrance, and pooling agreements.4 ° In the early
granted particular air rights. See Gertler, Nationality of Airlines: A Hidden Force in the
International Air Regulation Equation, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 51, 54 (1982).
2 Pooling agreements between airlines equalize the revenue between airlines
based on capacity offered. MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 29, at 33. Traditionally,
70-80% of the route-miles performed in Europe have been subject to pooling
agreements. Feazel, ECAC Leaders Expected to Approve Liberalized Regulatory Proposals,
Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 17, 1985, at 28, 29.
, Barrett, supra note 19, at 35 (not discussing pooling agreements).
:w See Dempsey, The Role of the International Civil Aviation Organization on Deregula-
tion, Discrimination, and Dispute Resolution, 52 J. AIR L. & CoM. 529 (1987).
Fink, Transport's Long Haul to Profits, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 11, 1985, at
11.
Liberal Regulatory Environment, supra note 15, at 105.
New Agreements Spur European Liberalization, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 12,
1984, at 71 [hereinafter New Agreements].
3" P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 99-100.
Increased Liberalization, supra note 17, at 36.
Id.
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1980s, the ECAC and the United States signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding that liberalizes regulation of
North Atlantic fares. 4' And late in 1986, ECAC approved
two Memoranda of Understanding involving liberalization
of intra-European tariffs and capacity.
The AEA, which promotes the interests of the airlines
in the EEC and at air transport conferences, has approved
a policy calling for only limited liberalization.4 2 This pol-
icy includes proposals providing for flexibility in capacity,
tariffs, market access, and state aid.43
A. International Air Transport Association
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) is
composed of more than 100 air carriers, including airlines
from all EEC Member States except Luxembourg.44 More
than 70% of IATA member routes involve Europe. 45 As
one of the most influential airline organizations in the
world,46 the IATA organizes conferences for the coordi-
nation of tariffs. 7 After the conferences, airlines file the
proposed tariffs with their respective governments. 48
The IATA sees liberalization as inevitable 49 and has re-
cently shifted toward partial support of deregulation. 50
But by no means does it support total deregulation. 5 '
The deregulation of U.S. airlines eliminated IATA's tariff-
" This pact was signed by the United States and by Italy, Belgium, France,
West Germany, Greece, the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Ire-
land, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.
U.S., ECAC Sign Atlantic Fare Pact, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 22, 1984, at 33; see
Turbulence, supra note 23, at 353.
42 European Airlines, supra note 16, at 31.
4.3 Cf Barrett, supra note 19, at 35 (criticizing restraints on these areas).
• , P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 269.
4r, Barnabo, Regulatory Reform in Europe, IATA REV., Oct.-Dec. 1985, at 11.
-, P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 269.
47 Id. at 38-45.
• , Turbulence, supra note 23, at 313-15.
41 Fink, supra note 35, at 11.
.,, Liberal Regulatory Environment, supra note 15, at 105.
5, Deregulation Drive Stalls Out at IATA Annual General Meeting, TRAFFIC WORLD,
Nov. 12, 1984, at 44 [hereinafter Deregulation Stall].
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setting role in the world's largest airline market.52 On
May 6, 1981, the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) is-
sued a final order prohibiting U.S. carriers from partici-
pating in IATA Tariff Coordinating Conferences. 5' The
CAB found that the rate-fixing portion of the Conference
agreements substantially reduced competition.54 But the
CAB was "sunset" on December 31, 1984, before it is-
sued a final decision in the IATA proceeding. The De-
partment of Transportation, which inherited the CAB's
jurisdiction over international aviation, terminated this
controversial proceeding in 1985.55
The deregulation of the United States air transport in-
dustry created a new problem for the IATA - the poten-
tial loss of U.S. antitrust immunity.56 IATA responded
with plans to establish U.S. corporations to overcome an-
titrust exposure in the United States.57
The IATA has been accused of violating the competi-
tion laws of the Treaty of Rome with its tariff coordination
activities. 58 IATA price-fixing potentially violates Article
85, which prohibits the direct or indirect "fixing of
purchase or selling prices or of any other trading condi-
tions." ' 59 Furthermore, since consumers receive no benefit
from the price-fixing, Article 85(3) does not apply.60 This
provision creates a potential exception to the competition
laws for agreements which "contribute to the improve-
ment of the production or distribution of goods ... while
reserving to users an equitable share in the profits result-
"161ing therefrom ....
52 Liberal Regulatory Environment, supra note 15, at 103.
.5. Tompkins, The North Atlantic - Competition or Confrontation, 7 AIR L. 48, 49
(1982); P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 40-45.
.54 Order No. 81-5-27, 89 C.A.B. 468, 498 (1981).
r,5 Turbulence, supra note 23, at 353-54.
:,, Deregulation Stall, supra note 51, at 45.
5 7 Feazel, New IATA Director General Plans to Stress Service to Airlines, Av. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Feb. 11, 1985, at 35, 37.
58 Letter from Knut Hammarskjold, supra note 14.
.,! Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 85(1).
, Dagtoglou, Air Transport and the European Community, 6 EUR. L. REv. 335, 352
(1981).
,1 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 85(3).
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In response to the pressure for liberalization, the IATA
has already implemented some formal changes. In the
early 1980's, the IATA suspended compulsory participa-
tion in tariff negotiations by IATA members, and discon-
tinued imposition of conditions of in-flight service in
agreements.6 2 The IATA has also begun formal meetings
with nonmembers.63
Structural changes within the IATA Tariff Conferences
are making it easier to experiment with new fares and
services. 64 An important factor added to the IATA proce-
dures is that the burden of proof rests on airlines blocking
new fares rather than on the carrier proposing them. Fur-
thermore, only the airlines involved in the route may par-
ticipate, whereas previously any carrier could object to a
fare.65
While IATA still serves important functions in tariff-set-
ting, its absolute power has been diminished. In a practi-
cal sense, the IATA has been transformed from an
international quasi-regulatory agency to an influential
trade association. 66
B. European Civil Aviation Conference
The European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC),
which includes the directors general of twenty-two Euro-
pean countries, does not have direct regulatory power,
but strongly influences European air transport policies.6 7
The ECAC makes recommendations and resolutions
which are considered by its members and often imple-
mented by them as regulations. 68 The ECAC was respon-
sible for Europe's first step toward deregulation, the 1956
multilateral agreement on non-scheduled services. To-
.12 International Air Fares, supra note 25, at 11.
Liberal Regulatory Environment, supra note 15, at 102.
New Agreements, supra note 37, at 71.
65 Id. at 76.
wo Liberal Regulatory Environment, supra note 15, at 102.
67 Id. at 105.
- P. DEMPSEY, Supra note 1, at 99-100.
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day, chartered carriers account for more than 50% of Eu-
rope's passenger air transport, with minimal regulation.
The top aviation officials of the ECAC unanimously is-
sued a policy statement committing their governments to
increasingly liberal regulatory schemes throughout the
continent.69 Commitment to liberalization by the ECAC is
endorsed by senior aviation officials of all twenty-two
member countries.70 The policy statement lays a founda-
tion for further agreements. It includes more flexibility in
fare-setting, increased opportunity to enter new markets,
and reduced emphasis on pooling agreements. Nearly
every nation involved was dissatisfied with some portion
of the policy statement. The principal disagreement con-
cerned whether airlines should be protected by
governments.7
In spite of disagreement, the ECAC has engaged in pol-
icy negotiations with the United States. In October 1984,
the United States and ECAC signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) that liberalizes regulation of North
Atlantic fares. The pact set "zones of reasonableness" for
North Atlantic fares through April 30, 1987.72 A new,
two-year memorandum with even more liberal provisions
was signed in February 1987. Under the new agreement,
deep-discount fare zones have been dropped an average
of 10%, and such fares may be offered with fewer restric-
tions.73 With this system, airlines have freedom to set
transatlantic fares without government intervention so
long as they fall within an agreed-upon percentage above
w, Increased Liberalization, supra note 17, at 36.
- Liberal Regulatory Environment, supra note 15, at 105.
7, Increased Liberalization, supra note 17, at 36.
72 U.S., European Carmers Extend Agreement on North Atlantic Fares, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Apr. 8, 1985, at 31 [hereinafter U.S., European Carriers].
7. ECAC, US. Renew North Atlantic Pact, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 23, 1987,
at 32. The agreement is effective for a two year period, beginning April 1, 1987.
The following 16 ECAC Member States are affected by it: Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.
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or below a reference price. 7' Thus far, the agreement has
been found to have increased stability in transatlantic air
transport.7 5
In December of 1986, ECAC concluded two Memo-
randa of Understanding regarding intra-European sched-
uled air tariffs and capacity. The former is the first effort
by a significant number of European states to embrace a
tariff scheme whereby rates falling within a specific range
are automatically approved by the involved governments.
The tariff MOU establishes a Discount Zone of 90 to 65
percent and a Deep Discount Zone of 65 to 45 percent of
the reference price, provided that the passengers using
them satisfy certain conditions. The MOU on capacity
sharing allows either participating nation to provide up to
55 percent of the market's capacity as opposed to the pre-
vious 50/50 sharing standard. Thus, for the twenty-two
ECAC member nations (which include all twelve EEC
members), liberalization in the areas of rates and capacity
took an important first step forward in December of
1986.76
C. Association of European Airlines
The Association of European Airlines (AEA) represents
the thirteen largest scheduled airlines in Europe. It is
more conservative on the liberalization issue than most
organizations. The AEA acts as a trade association to pro-
mote the interests of the airlines in the EEC and at air
transport conferences. It has approved a policy calling for
only limited liberalization. Aer Lingus, British Airways,
British Caledonian, Iberia, KLM, and UTA would have
preferred a more liberal position. Air France led the op-
position, advocating a more heavily regulated
environment.77
74 U.S., ECAC Sign Atlantic Fare Pact, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 22, 1984, at
33.
75 U.S., European Carriers, supra note 72, at 31.
71 ECAC Approves Liberalizing Fare, Capacity Regulations, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Jan. 12, 1987, at 36.
7 European Airlines, supra note 16, at 29.
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The AEA recommendations are generally based on its
view concerning the best way to provide an economically
sound and stable air transport industry. In its proposals,
the AEA has consistently considered the special relation-
ship between airlines and their governments and the po-
tential dangers of putting European airlines at a
competitive disadvantage. The AEA prefers a pragmatic
approach for gradual change which would ensure orderly
competition, maintain benefits of "inter-airline" coordi-
nation, and avoid additional regulatory controls.78
The AEA proposals provide for flexibility in capacity,
tariffs, market access, state aid, and competition rules,
subject to certain limitations on geographical scope and
exemptions. 79 The proposals lay down detailed rules for
applying Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome to air
transport, stating that the rules should apply only to inter-
national air transport between Community airports,
should not apply to technical standards of improvement,
and should not interfere with relations and agreements
with nonmember states.80
The AEA also advocates capacity agreements which
would provide that airline facilities used by the traveling
public be proportional to the public's requirements, that
fair and equal opportunity be granted airlines of any two
states to use any route between the two states, and that
each state must consider the other state's requirements
and services. 8 ' The suggested time limit for AEA propos-
als is 4 years, with review before the proposals'
expiration.8 2
The EEC Commission has criticized the AEA's propos-
als on grounds that the suggested changes in capacity
71 President's Special Assembly of the Ass'n of European Airlines, European Air
Transport Policy - AEA Proposals, Sept. 27, 1985, at I [hereinafter European Air
Transport Policy].
71 Id. at 1-21; cf Barrett, supra note 19, at 35 (criticizing restraints on competi-
tion in capacity, market access and fares).
.1 European Air Transport Policy, supra note 78, at 14, 17-18.
" Id. at 7.
" Id. at 9.
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agreements would add no new freedom and fares would
still be fixed. An additional concern is that the AEA has
called for exemptions for all existing practices, rendering
any new proposals useless.A3
The AEA is a major supporter of the Tariff Reform Ac-
tion Package of 1985. This package includes streamlined
conference procedures, revamped Traffic Conference
Bulletins with a special European edition circulated to all
European governments and regulatory institutions, and
improved consumer contacts.8 4 The AEA also supports a
tariff reduction package that would set up new zones for
discount fares.8 5 While the AEA failed to speak with a
common voice, it does appear to be promoting a degree
of liberalization.
IV. ACTIONS TAKEN BY INDIVIDUAL STATES:
LIBERAL BILATERALS
While free competition may develop more easily in a
large, unified market such as that found in the United
States, it is much more difficult to obtain where the mar-
ket consists of a large number of independent nations.
State sovereignty is the most formidable obstacle to free
competition in international aviation.8 6 Bilateral agree-
ments have been the preferred instrument of nations
seeking to protect their own state interests and those of
their airlines and consumers from the effects of unre-
strained competition.87 Recently, bilateral agreements
between some of Europe's more liberal governments
aimed at encouraging competition in certain markets have
offered a glimpse of what fares and services might resem-
ble throughout Europe were a multilateral agreement to
be reached. 8
I. Community: Airlines' Proposals Disappoint Commission, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH),
at 1-2 (Nov. 7, 1985).
84 See generally Barnabo, supra note 45.
European Airlines, supra note 16, at 29.
Thaine, supra note 27, at 91.
87 Id.
11 Two years after Britain and Holland deregulated air transport between the
6291988]
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The key to liberalization of the European airline indus-
try ultimately rests with the individual nations of Europe.
As a practical matter, without the consent of the Member
States, the Council of the EEC is powerless to enact rules
by which the Treaty of Rome would apply to air transport.
Nor could the recommendations of the individual groups
promoting liberalization be implemented without state
action.
Regulation or deregulation of European airlines begins
not with action over privately owned carriers by a single
regulatory agency as in the United States, but through
member nations' and community regulations over state-
owned or subsidized airlines. Bilateral agreements are
often employed as a means by which the respective gov-
ernments avoid actions by competitors deemed to be
harmful to their airlines. 89 The bilaterals which have
evolved establish conditions necessary to the exchange of
air rights.90 Such bilaterals frequently restrict capacity and
market access and provide for revenue sharing (pool-
ing).9' The shift away from bilateral agreements that
serve to protect state sovereignty toward a community
policy of free competition is emerging only gradually.
Individual states are recognizing that some liberaliza-
tion is inevitable. Deregulation of U.S. airlines has in-
creased pressure on North Atlantic routes and spurred
competition with European airlines.92 That the tide of
pervasive regulation is turning can be seen in the efforts
of individual European states which have grown impatient
with lack of progress toward liberalization.
The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have led the
two countries, the Amsterdam-London route has become the busiest in Europe
with 210 weekly flights by seven scheduled airlines. Airline Observer, Av. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Nov. 17, 1986, at 33; see also More and Merrier, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8;
1986, at 90; P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 102-04.
- Sorensen, supra note 23, at 4.
I'l Comment, Introducing Competition to the European Economic Community Airline In-
dustry, 15 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 364, 376 (1985).
1, Id. at 377.
112 Liberal Regulatory Environment, supra note 15, at 103.
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fight for liberalization, insisting that both consumers and
airlines benefit from the pressures of the marketplace.93
The British government, which has been aggressively
pushing for lower fares in Europe, has been the common
denominator in most of the new liberal fare agreements in
Europe.94 The efforts of Britain and other nations have
been reflected to a large extent in bilateral agreements
which, it was hoped, would ultimately result in a Europe-
wide system of deregulated aviation.95 It has been sug-
gested that the recent series of liberalized bilaterals has
done more than anything else to create a climate condu-
cive to reform. 96
The U.K. agreement with Luxembourg, which was en-
tered into in March of 1985, was the first to liberalize
route access, capacity controls and tariff approvals.97 The
agreement provided for unrestricted market entry and ca-
pacity. Fares may be rejected only by the agreement of
both governments (this is referred to as a "double disap-
proval" pricing provision), 98 although the country of ori-
gin may unilaterally reject a fare which it considers
predatory or excessive in relation to costs. 99 The lan-
guage of this agreement was used as a model for subse-
quent bilaterals,100 and this is the type of agreement which
the British would like to see instituted throughout the
EEC.10 1
In June 1984, Britain joined forces with the Nether-
lands in a major agreement which went far beyond any
EEC proposals. 0 2 This agreement was followed by an-
w, Increased Liberalization, supra note 17, at 36.
,14 New Agreements, supra note 37, at 75.
!- S. WHEATCROFT & G. LIPMAN, AIR TRANSPORT IN A COMPETITIVE EUROPEAN
MARKET 65 (1986) [hereinafter AIR TRANSPORT].
i" Air Cartel, supra note 1, at 23, 31.
97 AIR TRANSPORT, supra note 95, at 66.
11 Brown, Britain Urges Deregulation Effort in 1986, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec.
2, 1985, at 36.
9, AIR TRANSPORT, supra note 95, at 213.
-,, Id. at 66.
-1 Brown, supra note 98, at 36.
.... New Agreements, supra note 37, at 76.
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other in June 1985 which went further, including several
of the provisions of the Luxembourg agreement while
maintaining the 1984 provisions requiring the matching
of fares on fifth freedom routes. 10 3 The agreement gives
carriers between the two countries almost unlimited op-
portunity to offer additional capacity and discount
fares. 0 4 Any certified airline may fly to any point in either
country and thereafter to a second point within the coun-
try or on to a third country. Schedules and capacity are
not controlled, and fares are controlled by the country of
origin.10 5 The Dutch-British bilateral spurred other, less
sweeping agreements between Britain and West Ger-
many, Switzerland, France, Finland, Greece, Spain, Italy
and Portugal. 10 6
Renegotiation of the agreement with the Federal Re-
public of Germany met with limited success, although it
was somewhat similar to the Dutch-British bilateral.10 7
The agreement provided some liberalization of route ac-
cess, but improved tariff approval procedures only
minimally. 108
The agreement between the United Kingdom and
France, concluded in September 1985, incorporated only
a relaxation of the capacity sharing requirements from a
rigid 50/50 split to allowing one nation to carry up to 55
percent of the traffic. 109 This agreement also changed
destination restrictions. 110 Even though the bilateral was
the most restrictive entered into with Britain, its achieve-
ment was significant, considering France's strong opposi-
tion to any kind of liberalization.11
The bilateral with France was followed, in October
'l AIR TRANSPORT, supra note 95, at 65, 66.
.... New Agreements, supra note 37, at 71.
1115 Brown, supra note 98, at 36.
"ll New Agreements, supra note 37, at 72-73.
,,,7 AIR TRANSPORT, supra note 95, at 65.
I'l Brown, supra note 98, at 36.
AIR TRANSPORT, supra note 95, at 66.
" Britain and France Agree to Liberalized Air Services, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct.
14, 1985, at 41.
I P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 103.
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1985, by an agreement with Belgium which incorporated
the most liberal provisions of the Luxembourg and
Netherlands agreements.' 12 In this agreement, access and
capacity are unrestricted. As in the Luxembourg bilateral,
tariffs may be rejected only by the agreement of both gov-
ernments. It also contains provisions for rejecting fares
which are predatory or excessive in relation to costs.1
3
In December 1985, Britain and Switzerland signed two
new service agreements liberalizing airline regulation be-
tween Switzerland and Britain or Hong Kong." 4 The
Swiss agreement liberalized route access and capacity
control, but resembled the German agreement in its tariff-
setting provisions. The sole change in tariff provisions
was to require only country of origin approval with re-
spect to special fares.1 15
The efforts of the U.K. to create a European common
market in aviation, as reflected in the agreements with the
Benelux countries, revolve around route access, capacity
control and tariff approval. 1 6 As set forth in the agree-
ment with Luxembourg, route access provisions would
basically allow free entry to all airports by airlines subject
only to limitations on services available at airports. The
policy regarding capacity would allow airlines the free-
dom unilaterally to decide the appropriate level, so long
as the objective was to provide adequate capacity at rea-
sonable load factors. Either country may call for consulta-
tions if it feels that its interests are being damaged." 7
With respect to tariff approval, agreements would prefera-
bly not require the airlines to consult together before-
hand. Tariffs would be subject to the principle of "double
disapproval," wherein tariffs automatically become effec-
tive unless disapproved within thirty days by both govern-
,12 AIR TRANSPORT, supra note 95, at 66.
Brown, supra note 98, at 36.
British, Swiss Sign New Air Services Pacts, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 16,
1985, at 42.
AIR TRANSPORT, supra note 95, at 66.
Id. at 66, 67.
"17 id. at 66.
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ments. The country of origin would be able to act
unilaterally to disapprove tariffs considered predatory or
excessive, and countries would otherwise be required to
consult together to resolve perceived abuses." 8
As a result of initiatives of the Irish minister for commu-
nications and an Irish airline, additional movement to-
ward deregulation has begun in that country. These
initiatives were pursued in order to take back routes lost
to British Airways after Britain's liberalization of the Bel-
fast-London route. Ryanair, a new Irish airline, reduced
round-trip fares on the Dublin-London route from 208 to
95 British pounds. The new airline established under de-
regulation has sparked a dramatic surge in Irish travel and
induced British Airways and Aer Lingus to reduce fares.
In September through November 1986, traffic increases
of 35%, 38%, and 40% .over the same months of 1985
occurred. Other nations are expected to follow Ireland's
lead. " 9
Ulrich Meir, Lufthansa's deputy general manager re-
sponsible for international relations, argues the Dutch-
British agreement and subsequent bilateral agreements
have taken the deregulation initiative away from the
EEC. 20 Indeed, Rodney Muddle, British Airways' general
manager for pricing, suggested, "The EEC is a bench-
mark. It forces people to think about these issues and
keep them in the public attention. But I think the main
changes are going to be on a bilateral basis."'' 2 ' Airline
officials believe that progress being made on the bilateral
front may indicate there is minimal need for EEC-man-
dated action. 22
On the other hand, authors Wheatcroft and Lipman ar-
gue that bilateral agreements maintain their momentum
only as long as willing partners can be found, and that
, Id. at 67; P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 58-62.
Barrett, supra note 19, at 35.
"21 New Agreements, supra note 37, at 75.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 76.
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indications are that the "UK liberal bilateral experiment is
running out of steam. . . ." They base this conclusion on
limited U.S. success in negotiating bilateral agreements in
the early 1970s and again in the late 1970s, and on the
differing "competitive capabilities and national interests"
of European states under which they will only agree to
provisions which they perceive to be in their own best in-
terests. Moreover, considering that aviation constitutes
only one of many factors making up the European econ-
omy, individual nations can bring various economic and
political influences to bear to scuttle disfavored aviation
bilaterals. 123
In spite of British initiatives, many scheduled carriers
have declined to offer competitive rates.1 24 Furthermore,
with the privatization of British Airways, Britain retreated
somewhat to a more conservative position than that evi-
denced by the liberal bilaterals. 125 At this point, the pro-
spectus for additional liberal bilaterals in Europe appears
dim. 12
6
It must be kept in mind that although European nations
favor liberalization, no consensus exists as to the degree
of liberalization or the appropriate methods that should
be employed. Perhaps the most difficult obstacles to
overcome are the perceptions held by members of the Eu-
ropean community.
Sovereignty is the most formidable obstacle to a free
market and free competition. 27 Nations refuse to create a
regime which might cause their state airlines to fail. IATA
Director George R. Besse notes that airlines are "tools of
prestige, of privilege. There is a social and political order
connected with running an airline, and like it or not, that's
the way it is.' ' 28
Another problem is the immediate desire to create a
124 AlR TRANSPORT, supra note 95, at 68-69.
1 P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 103.
1" Air Cartel, supra note 1, at 23, 31.
126 P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 103-04.
127 Thaine, supra note 27, at 91.
, Deregulation Stall, supra note 51, at 44.
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rule to fix every problem, whether it truly needs fixing or
not. "Whenever there was a problem we used to write a
rule for it," said one airline employee, speaking of how
the airline handled passenger service difficulties. "But
regulations tended to stifle employees.' ' 129
The general distrust of the free market in Europe also
creates an environment hostile to liberalization. Karl-
Heinz Neumeister, Secretary General of the AEA, said
concerning increased profits of European airlines, "It is
odd to note that when comparable net profits are an-
nounced in America, Wall Street considers the airline
concerned to have done well and their share prices react
accordingly. On this side of the Atlantic, such a perform-
ance is usually greeted with cries of profiteering and
cartelism."130
Finally, the perception that air transit is in the nature of
a public utility allows governments to justify their perva-
sive interference. For example, Austria and the AEA have
taken the position that while some liberalization is in or-
der, airlines are essentially public utilities. 13 ' Karl-Heinz
Neumeister observed:
It remains a fact that scheduled air transport is a form of
public utility. That means the airline has certain responsi-
bilities, one of which is to provide a service according to a
published schedule, irrespective of whether there is suffi-
cient demand for a given flight. With such obligations, it
is quite normal to receive compensation in return. This is
usually expressed by limiting the number of airlines on a
route. ' 3
2
In spite of the obstacles to liberalization, the increasing
number of liberal bilateral agreements is evidence that the
European nations are heading toward a more free market-
oriented air transport system. Moreover, the EEC's au-
"2 Competition Leads to Better Passenger Service, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 11,
1985, at 185.
..... European Airline Profits Expected to Reach $1 Billion This Year, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Jan. 6, 1986, at 48.
Increased Liberalization, supra note 17, at 36.
Id.
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thority under the Treaty of Rome supersedes that of its
members' national governments in a number of areas, in-
cluding farm prices, rules for fishing in the seas around
member countries, competition policy, and GATT negoti-
ations. Community law, beginning with the Treaty of
Rome, takes precedence over the national laws of member
nations. 3 3 Sovereignty is slowly eroding. "In the long
run," as EEC Commissioner Peter Sutherland writes,
"Europeans, to have a chance of survival, must unite."' 13 4
V. ACTIONS TAKEN BY INDIVIDUAL AIRLINES
Individual airlines are joining the effort for a free mar-
ket for air transport. Modifications are appearing in the
activities of European nations and individual airlines to
accommodate the changes in the air transport market. In
general, because airlines have been prohibited from en-
gaging in price competition, they have instead competed
in areas of service, such as frequency of flights and quality
of on-board service. 135
Several individual airlines are also taking direct action
against the restraints on air transport. In October 1985,
British Caledonian withdrew from further participation in
the political committee of the AEA after the leaders of the
twenty member airlines refused to agree to liberalization
measures. British Caledonian proposed the institution of
a more simple and flexible fare system that would allow
competition, an end to pooling agreements, greater free-
dom of market access, and the abolition of all subsidies to
state-owned airlines. 136
British Caledonian's position has been supported by
British Airways, Aer Lingus, and KLM. 13 7 Those in oppo-
... Don't Take Europa to Brussels, They Cry, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 1986, at 55 [here-
inafter Don't Take Europa].
,4 Sutherland, The Competition Policy of the European Community, 30 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 149, 154 (1985).
, * Carriers Plan Increased Capacity on Atlantic Following Boom Year, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Mar. 18, 1985, at 227, 228.
rw British Caledonian, supra note 18, at 36.
1:17 Id,
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sition include Air France, Alitalia, Scandinavian Airlines
System, and Olympic, all owned or subsidized by govern-
ments which have generally opposed liberalization. 13 8 It
appears that several individual airlines recognize that lib-
eralization is inevitable and are attempting to adapt to the
new environment.
VI. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
A. The Treaty of Rome
The EEC was established in 1957 by the Treaty of
Rome 39 and, with the addition of Spain and Portugal on
January 1, 1986, has grown to twelve member nations.1 40
The treaty is essentially the constitution of the EEC.141
The twin goals of the community, as described by Peter
Sutherland, EEC Commissioner tor Competition, are "the
completion of a genuine, barrier-free internal market and
the restoration and enhancement of the competitiveness
of European industry. Free competition, within the limits
set by law, provides the best way of achieving these
goals.' 142
The Treaty of Rome bound together the nations of
Western Europe for the purpose of creating an economi-
cally efficient market in Europe and restricting anticompe-
titive behavior on the part of the member nations.' 43 The
goals of the Treaty include harmonious development and
expansion of economic activities, increased economic sta-
bility, an improved standard of living, and closer relations
between the Member States.' 44 To accomplish its goals,
the Treaty directed the EEC to adopt, inter alia, a common
transport policy. ' 45
1-s Id.
Im, Treaty of Rome, supra note 7.
14, Wassenbergh, Regulatory Reform - A Challenge to Inter-Governmental Civil Avia-
tion Conferences, 11 AIR L. 31, 40 n.26 (1986).
1.. Sutherland, supra note 134, at 149.
14': Id.
4. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 3.
14 Id. art. 2.
'1. Id. art. 3(e).
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The Treaty was enacted with the presumption that "na-
tional economies can be unified only if there is an efficient
system for moving people and goods."'146 The impor-
tance of transport in Europe is evidenced by the fact that
the industry accounts for more than 7 percent of Europe's
Gross National Product, for employment of between 5.4
percent and 7.3 percent of the working population, and
for 11 percent and 40 percent of private and public invest-
ment, respectively.147 The draftsmen of the Treaty of
Rome were cognizant of the integrating function of trans-
port as well as its unique problems. Thus, they gave spe-
cial consideration to air transport under the Treaty. A
major consideration was the coordination of sovereign
rights both inside and outside the boundaries of the
EEC. 148
The solicitude for transportation arose, to a significant
extent, because of longstanding bilateral and multilateral
treaties among Member States concerning international
airline coordination that already existed at the adoption
of the Treaty in 1957, such as the Chicago Convention on
International Civil Aviation of 1944 and the numerous bi-
lateral air transport agreements between European na-
tions. 49 The draftsmen of the Treaty were unable to
design a policy to benefit the EEC while maintaining the
integrity of extra-EEC treaties. 5 0 Consequently, air trans-
port policy made little headway during the EEC's first two
decades, since Member States' governments were satisfied
with the status quo. 5 1
However, the importance of transportation in the over-
... 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1802 (1974).
147 Anastassopoulos, Report Drawn Up on Behalf of the Committee of Transport on the
Judgment of the Court ofJustice on the Common Transport Policy and the Council's Obligation
in Relation Thereto, 1985-1986 EUR. PARL. Doc. (A 2-84/85/B) 15 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Report].
- 1980-1981 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 469) 14 (1980).
.... See Turbulence, supra note 23, at 307-08, 314-18, 325-42.
'" 1 Common Mkt Rep. (CCH) 1945.05 (1974) ("[w]ith respect to transport
by sea and air, Article 84(2) makes the applicability of the Title 'Transport' depen-
dent upon a unanimous Council decision").
,1, Sorensen, supra note 23, at 3.
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all scheme of the European Economic Community was
underscored by separate provisions in the Treaty of Rome
for a common transport policy.1 52 A common transport
policy for rail, roads, and inland waterways was adopted
in 1968.153 Special solicitude was shown for sea and air
transport in Article 84(2), which provided: "The Council,
acting by means of a unanimous vote, may decide
whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropri-
ate provisions may be adopted for sea and air trans-
port." 154 A formal policy for sea transport was adopted in
1986. But the Council has failed to enact regulations
under Article 84(2) for air transport.'5 5
In view of the widely perceived shortcomings in the
EEC's approach to air transport policies and procedures,
it was to be expected that the debate should turn to the
general competition provisions of Articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty of Rome. 5 6 The applicability of these rules to
air transport within the EEC has been a central issue since
the mid-1970s.' 57 While it was concluded that the compe-
tition rules would, indeed, be applied to air transport, the
question was where, when, and how. 158 Even though the
European Court of Justice declared in the 1986 Nouvelles
Frontie'res case that the competition rules applied to air
transport, significant questions nevertheless remained un-
answered. 159 Before proceeding to a more in-depth anal-
ysis of actions taken in response to the competition rules,
the following general discussion of the rules should serve
as a helpful background.
Competition was intended to play an essential role in
achieving the objectives of the EEC. 160 In order to dimin-
'., Common Transport Policy, 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1812 (1974).
':' P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 245.
154 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 84(2).
'. P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 245.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, arts. 85, 86.
157 AIR TRANSPORT, supra note 95, at 55-56.
," Id. at 56.
Id.; see also infra notes 248-253 and accompanying text.
P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 242.
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ish barriers to the free flow of commerce, the draftsmen
included Articles 85 and 86 in the Treaty, prohibiting an-
ticompetitive activities.' 6' The Commission has declared
that competition is the best motivator of economic activity
and is essential for the improvement of living standards
and employment prospects. 6 2 As a basic policy issue, Ar-
ticle 2 of the Treaty incorporates the goal of efficient eco-
nomic integration of the Community. 63 Article 3(f)
directs the implementation of a system assuring that com-
petition will not be distorted within the Common Mar-
ket. 164 The competition rules generally aim at preventing
the introduction of obstacles to free trade, but this does
not mean that the Community policy on competition is
basically restrictive. Indeed, cooperation among enter-
prises is permitted and even encouraged where the effect
is to promote competition both inside and outside of the
Community.1 65  The primary thrust of the competition
laws of the EEC is to maintain a "beneficial, unified econ-
omy."'1 6 6 Unlike the United States, the EEC competition
laws are aimed only at anticompetitive practices which
produce abusive, harmful effects in the marketplace. 67
The Treaty of Rome is basically the Constitution of the
European Economic Community. 68 Consequently, Com-
munity law, including competition law, takes precedence
over the law of the individual Member States, and the
-1 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, arts. 85, 86.
... P. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 167 (4th ed. 1985)
Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 2.
'- Id. art. 3. Activities in Article 3 which are pertinent to competition include:
(e) the inauguration of a common transport policy;
(f) the establishment of a system ensuring that competition shall not be dis-
torted in the Common Market;
(g) the application of procedures which shall make it possible to co-ordinate
the economic policies of Member States and to remedy disequilibria in their bal-
ances of payments;
(h) the approximation of their respective municipal law to the extent necessary
for the functioning of the Common Market.
Id.; see also P. MATHIJSEN, supra note 162, at 179.
"' P. MATHIJSEN, supra note 162, at 168.
P,' p. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 241-55.
167 Id.
-8 Id. at 242.
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governments of those states must bring their laws into
conformity with the mandates and decisions of the EEC
ministers and the decisions of the Court of Justice.6 9
The Commission may exercise considerable jurisdiction
in enforcing the competition rules of the Treaty.1 70 Arti-
cles 85 and 86 are administered by the Commission as set
forth in Regulation 17.171 Under Regulation 17, the Com-
mission may grant "negative clearances," declaring agree-
ments not to be violative of Articles 85 and 86. Pursuant
to Article 85(3), it may grant exemptions from the appli-
cability of Article 85(1). Upon application of Member
States, natural or legal persons, or upon its own motion, it
may take steps to put an end to violations, conduct inves-
tigations, and levy fines and penalties. 72
Article 85(1) prohibits as "incompatible with the Com-
mon Market ... any agreements between enterprises, any
decisions by associations of enterprises and any concerted
practices which are likely to affect trade between the
Member States and which have as their object or result
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the Common Market .... In order to fall within
Id.; Don't Take Europa, supra note 133, at 55. National courts of Member
States may be used to enforce the competition laws of the Treaty of Rome, and
this route is being encouraged by the Commission to reduce its increasing work-
load. Only national courts may award damages in private litigation for injuries
suffered through infringement of Articles 85 and 86. Compare Treaty of Rome,
supra note 7, art. 177; 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4656 (1978) (preliminary
rulings by Court of Justice); with Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 183; 3 Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4685 (1978) (jurisdiction of national courts).
170 P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 242.
171 P. MATHIJSEN, supra note 162, at 181.
172 Id. at 182-83.
173 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 85(1). Article 85(1) "in particular" pro-
hibits practices which, aside from satisfying the other criteria, consist of:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of
any other trading conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical devel-
opment or investment;
(c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in re-
spect of equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage; or
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance
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the proscriptions, agreements having proscribed objects
must be cast in the form of a legally binding contract. If
such an agreement can be found, a violation exists even if
it is not implemented. Alternatively, a violation of the
Treaty may be found if informal agreements are followed
by certain practices, or impermissible binding agreements
or practices may be inferred from circumstantial evidence,
including behavior having an anticompetitive effect. 174
However, it is important to note that an anticompetitive
effect alone, such as a parallel price increase, does not es-
tablish the existence of a prohibited agreement. Rather
such conduct may be the result of independent decisions
or other factors not reflecting violations of the competi-
tion rules. 75
The competition rules apply only to practices which af-
fect trade among Member States. 176 In an agreement be-
tween a Member State and a non-EEC nation,
anticompetitive provisions would not be prohibited unless
those provisions had an anticompetitive object or effect
within the EEC.177 "An agreement 'may' affect trade
when it 'is capable of constituting a threat, either direct or
indirect, actual or potential, to freedom of trade between
Member States in a manner which might harm the attain-
ment of the objectives of a single market between
States.' ",178 It should be noted that, because the prohibi-
tions extend to agreements which "affect" trade, even
agreements which have the effect of increasing the volume
of trade or which do not involve imports or exports may
be prohibited. 79 The European Court ofJustice has indi-
by a party of additional supplies which, either by their nature or ac-
cording to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of
such contract.
Id.
174 P. MATHUSEN, supra note 162, at 169-70.
17% Id. at 170.
7' Id. at 172.
'77 Id. at 172-74.
'78 Id. at 172 (quoting from Consten and Grundig v. Commission, 1966 Eur.
Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 299, 341).
171, P. MATHIJSEN, supra note 162, at 172 n.17, 174-75.
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cated that in order to constitute an impermissible "distor-
tion," competition "must be prevented, restricted or
distorted to an appreciable extent.' ' 80
Under Article 85(2), any agreements or decisions pro-
hibited by the treaty are automatically void.' 8' However,
with respect to entire agreements, only the clauses or pro-
visions found to be in violation are void; the remainder of
the agreements may remain in effect.' 8 2 Exceptions to the
"automatically void" provision exist for agreements exe-
cuted before March 13, 1962, when Regulation 17, the
first regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86, was en-
acted. 83 However, even the so-called "old" agreements
may be voided if found to be in violation of the Treaty. 84
Only the Commission may grant declarations of inap-
plicability of the operation of Article 85(1).185 Such ex-
emptions may be granted only after the Commission has
been notified and the four conditions specified in Article
85(3) are satisfied:
(1) The agreement must contribute to improving the
production or distribution of goods or to promoting tech-
nical and economic progress;
(2) consumers must get a fair share of the resulting
benefit;
(3) the agreement may not impose restrictions which
are not indispensible for the objectives under (1) and (2);
and
(4) the agreement may not afford the parties the possi-
bility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial
part of the products in question. 86
The exemptions may not take effect earlier than the
date the Commission is notified. The Commission must
set time limits on the duration of the exemptions and may
18o Id. at 173 (emphasis in original).
'"' Id. at 175.
182 Id. at 173.
-, Id. at 175.
114 Id. at 175-76.
" Id. at 176.
... See Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 85(3).
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attach conditions and obligations. Exemptions may be re-
newed or revoked, even retroactively.1 87
As the Commission and the Court have applied the
foregoing rules, the following main types of agreements
have been found likely to be prohibited:
a) agreements relating to prices and conditions of sale;
b) limitations on markets and production; c) agreements
whereby a vendor agrees not to compete within the mar-
ket of the purchaser; d) exclusive dealing agreements,
such as supply agreements; collective exclusive dealings;
and e) joint purchasing and joint selling agreements. 8 '
Current practices such as tariff agreements, pooling
agreements, and capacity and territorial restrictions, raise
a strong argument that European airlines are in violation
of Article 85 even under the most liberal bilateral agree-
ments. However, to date, carriers have avoided the direct
application of Article 85(1). The reason appears to be
grounded in the unique nature of European civil aviation,
including the strong impact of national sovereignty and
public policy embedded in the current system. No doubt,
avoiding the proscriptions of Article 85(1) can also, to
some extent, be justified by analogy to the principles set
forth in Article 85(3).
Article 86, which complements Article 85, forbids abuse
of a dominant position enjoyed individually or collectively
by a group of undertakings.1 89 "Dominant position" indi-
P. p. MATHIJSEN, supra note 162, at 177.
Id. at 177-78; Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 85(3).
, P. MATnIJSEN, supra note 162, at 179. Article 86 states that the prohibitions
are aimed at abuse of a dominant position "within the Common Market or within
a substantial part of it" which affects trade between Member States. Treaty of
Rome, supra note 7, art. 86 (emphasis added); see also 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
2101 (1978) (abuse of dominant position). The Article goes on to state:
Such improper practices may, in particular, consist in:
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or
selling prices or of any other inequitable trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development
to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in re-
spect of equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage; or
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cates a position of economic strength allowing the posses-
sor to "behave to an appreciable extent independently of
its competitors, customers and ultimately of the consum-
ers." 190 Whether an undertaking or group of undertak-
ings enjoys such a position must be established in view of
relevant product and geographical markets and the mar-
ket share possessed.' 9' Although the dominant position
must be over a substantial portion of the Common Mar-
ket, the territory of a single member state may be suffi-
cient for Article 86 to apply. Most European national
airlines, therefore, hold dominant positions in their own
countries.192 However, dominance is established not by
size alone, but rather by considering a number of
factors. 93
The concept of "abuse" of a dominant position refers
to an adverse impact on competition. 94 Any activity
which "interferes with one of the basic freedoms or the
free choice of purchasers or consumers or freedom of ac-
cess to business, must be viewed as limiting competition
and therefore as an 'abuse.' "95 The methods used to af-
fect competition are irrelevant. Activities which are "detri-
mental to production or sales, to purchasers or
consumers, and changes to the structure of an undertak-
ing which lead to competition being seriously disturbed in
a substantial part of the common market, are prohibited
by Article 86."196 The mere existence of a monopoly does
not establish a violation of Article 86; rather, only prac-
tices detrimental to consumers and the economy bring the
(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance,
by a party, of additional supplies which, either by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject
of such contract.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 86. Compare these latter "in particular" provi-
sions with those in Article 85(1), supra note 173.
P. MATHIJSEN, supra note 162, at 179-80; P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 248.
P. MATHIJSEN, supra note 162, at 180-81; P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 248.
192 P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 248.
19:1 P. MATHIJSEN, supra note 162, at 181.
I Id.
11.5 Id.
imi Id. at 179.
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proscriptions into play.' 97
In distinguishing Articles 85 and 86, it is important to
note that unlike Article 85, Article 86 does not provide for
exemptions. 98 Under Article 2 of Regulation 17, the
Commission may grant a "negative clearance," which
merely certifies that because it perceives no violation, the
Commission sees no reason to proceed against the enti-
ties involved.1 99 However, this does not confer "absolute
immunity;" the Commission still has power to determine
that a violation exists and to proceed with enforcement.20 0
Article 86 prohibits abuse of monopoly power, but the
mere existence of the monopoly is not prohibited.20 '
Rather, a violation consists of the use of monopoly power
in a manner injurious to consumers. A national airline
would likely be held to occupy a sufficiently dominant po-
sition over a large enough part of the Common Market
(its own country) to bring the provisions of Article 86 into
play. 20 2 Price-fixing and capacity-limitation agreements
by firms in monopoly positions might be held to be viola-
tions of Article 86.203 Therefore, a substantial argument
could be made that airline fare-setting and capacity limita-
tions and other agreements and practices violate Article
86.
Direct application of the competition rules could result
in the prohibition of many current European airline prac-
tices under both Articles 85 and 86. Indeed, the Commis-
sion threatened to take action on its own if the Council
failed to act on a common air transport policy.20 4 An un-
derstanding of the stalemate regarding the competition
rules necessarily requires further understanding of the
197 P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 248.
if's Id.
... Id. at 249 n.61.
2-.1 Id. at 249; Unlawful Practices by Dominant Concerns, Application of Article
86, 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2111 (1978) (CCH Explanation).
2-,, P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 248.
212 Id.
"1. Id.
D... Id. at 250.
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governing institutions of the EEC and the actions they
have taken in response to air transport issues.
The governing institutions of the Treaty of Rome were
created to ensure proper compliance and implementation
of its provisions.2"5 These four governing bodies of the
EEC, the Council, the Commission, Parliament, and the
European Court ofJustice, are in the process of determin-
ing how the Treaty of Rome should be applied to air
transport.
B. Institutions of the EEC
1. Parliament
The EEC Parliament is comprised of members who are
elected directly by the citizens of the twelve Member
States.206 Parliament's members are expected to act for
the benefit of the entire European Community, rather
than on behalf of their respective governments.2"7 Parlia-
ment has the duty of advising the Council on issues of im-
portance to the development of the EEC.20 8
As a matter of procedure, the Commission issues rec-
ommendations to the Council, which are subsequently re-
ferred to Parliament for further comment and
recommendation. Parliament generally comments on the
potential legal and political implications of the proposed
regulation.20 9
Parliament has expended years of effort to bring about
a comprehensive and coherent common transport pol-
icy. 210 Parliament's stated priorities are to bring the peo-
ple of Europe closer together, boost inter-Community
trade, encourage economic growth, reduce unemploy-
ment, open outlying regions, help bridge the gap between
the prosperous and impoverished regions, and remove
,"w L. HENKEN, supra note 9, at 1077.
2m" 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4306 (1987).
2,,7 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4302 (1987).
2(I /d.
See generally id.
- Report, supra note 147, at 7.
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congestion from certain overcrowded urban centers. Par-
liament envisions achievement of its objectives by the
construction of new major routes and infrastructure and
by the elimination of bottlenecks in existing route net-
works, to be paid for with taxpayer money.2 '
Parliament has approved a very cautious approach to
deregulation to be accomplished over a period of 14
years. Its advisory decisions would allow only limited ex-
emptions to the competition rules for the first seven years.
A recent parliamentary report has stated that either na-
tion involved should be able to unilaterally block new low
fares on a particular route. 2
2. The European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice is comprised of eleven
judges who are appointed for terms of six years by "com-
mon accord" of the Member States.2 13 The Court of Jus-
tice renders decisions on the application to Member
States of the Treaty of Rome. The Court interprets and
enforces the provisions of the Treaty of Rome.21 4 But the
Court will not participate in the procedural adoption of
competition laws.
There are several problems in using a Court of Justice
holding to change policy. Member States would have to
administer competition laws without guidance of regula-
tions from the Council. Consequently, laws would not be
applied with uniformity, because the individual states
would be free to interpret them as they pleased. Further-
more, competition laws would be invoked only when con-
venient to individual states, so they would have little
impact in increasing competition.1 5 The inconsistent ap-
plication of the competition laws would be adverse to one
211 Id at 21.
212 Europeans Advise Slow Deregulation Approach, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 23,
1985, at 39.
21"1 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4606, 4611 (1981).
2 4 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4600 (1981).
215- Letter from Knut Hammarskjold, supra note 14.
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purpose of the Treaty - to promote an economic and
harmonious transport system. 16 Moreover, a decision
applying the competition laws in the airline industry
would interfere with the Council's authority to adopt offi-
cial policy for the economic harmonization of air
transport.2 17
The Court has, however, rendered decisions of great
importance during the past decade which have held that
the competition laws of the Treaty of Rome do apply to
air transport, and that the Council has a duty under the
Treaty to formulate a coordinated transport policy for the
EEC. For example, in 1974 the Court pronounced that
the general rules of the Treaty, such as nondiscrimination
on national grounds, right of establishment, competition,
mobility of labor, and equal pay, apply to air transport.21 8
One important decision of the Court concerning Euro-
pean transportation was rendered in response to a com-
plaint brought against the Council by Parliament.21 9 On
January 22, 1983, Parliament brought an action against
the Council in the Court of Justice for a declaration that
the Council had failed to act in the field of common trans-
port policy. 220 Parliament also asked for a declaration that
the Council had breached the Treaty by failing to reach a
decision on sixteen specific proposals relating to trans-
port submitted to it by the Commission.221 Parliament's
position was that the establishment of a common trans-
port policy is a requirement flowing directly from the
Treaty.22
211, See Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, arts. 74-84.
217 Id. art. 84(2).
218 Sorensen, supra note 23, at 3.
211) European Parliament Committee on Transport, Notice to Members Concerning
the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 22 May 1985 in Case
13/83, European Parliament v. Council of the European Communities: Common Transport
Policy - Obligations of the Council, June 7, 1985, at 2 [hereinafter Obligations of the
Council].
22.. Bombardella, Analysis of the Judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 May 1985 -
Common Transport Policy - Council's Obligations, June 14, 1985, at 1.
2' Obligations of the Council, supra note 219, at 2.
222 European Parliament Committee on Transport, Notice to Members: Proceedings
Against the Council for Failure to Act, May 31, 1985, at 8 [hereinafter Proceedings].
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The Council took the view that the Parliament could
only supervise in a manner limited by Articles 137, 143,
and 144 of the Treaty, which govern the means available
to Parliament of influencing the activities of the Commis-
sion and the Council.2 If such were the case, Parliament
could not use its supervisory powers to bring an action for
failure to act. The Council also defended its lack of action
on grounds of the absence of agreement and the complex-
ity of the issue.224
The Court held that a complaint brought on grounds of
failure to act is admissible.225 This was the first time in
the history of the EEC that an action for failure to act has
been declared admissible in the Court of Justice.226 The
Court reasoned that the institutional position of a body,
as intended by the Treaty, particularly Article 4(1), would
be prejudiced if it were restricted in the exercise of that
power. The fact that the Parliament exercised political
control over the Commission, and to a certain extent the
Council, "does not affect the interpretation of the provi-
sions of the Treaty governing the legal remedies available
to the institutions. 227
The Court found a close connection between freedom
to provide services under Article 75(1)(a) and (b) and the
adoption of a common transport policy. Furthermore,
Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty define the scope of the
Council's obligation to introduce freedom to provide
services. 228 The Court held that the Council does not
have discretion in applying Articles 59 and 60. Articles
59, 60, and 61, in conjunction with 75(1)(a) and (b),
22-4 Bombardella, supra note 220, at 1.
224 See id. at 3.
225 Wijsenbeek, European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights
Opinion for the Committee on Transport on the Report on the Judgment of the Court ofJustice
on the Common Transport Policy and the Council's Obligation in Relation Thereto, June 28,
1985, at 3.
226 See Report, supra note 147, at 12 (first time Council found guilty of failure to
act); see also Wijsenbeek, supra note 225, at 3 (Parliament strengthened by fact
action for failure to act admissible).
227 Bombardella, supra note 220, at 2.
22H Obligations of the Council, supra note 219, at 6.
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clearly indicate that discretion may be exercised only with
regard to the details of how the objective will be
attained.229
The Court's decision confirmed that there was not a co-
herent body of rules which could be described as a com-
mon transport policy within the meaning of Articles 74
and 75 of the Treaty, but that this does not in all aspects
constitute a failure to act which is actionable under Article
175. The Court did conclude that the Council failed to
act with regard to freedom to provide services in the field
of international transport and the fixing of conditions
under which nonresident carriers may operate transport
services within a Member State, by not taking measures
necessary for that purpose before the expiration of the
transitional period (December 31, 1969), and that this was
in fact a breach of the Treaty.23 °
The Court qualified its grant of review by holding that
the failure to act must relate to measures which the Coun-
cil has not adopted and which are specific enough for the
judgment to be executed under Article 176. In other
words, Parliament must show that the Council has com-
pletely failed to act where there is a specific directive re-
quiring action. Furthermore, the measures forming the
subject matter of the dispute must be sufficiently defined
to allow the Court to appraise the legality of their adop-
tion or nonadoption. 23 1 But if the Parliament had speci-
fied which measures the Council should have adopted in
the common transport policy, it would have risked having
the case dismissed as an encroachment on the Council's
discretion.23 2
As to the objective difficulties which, according to the
Council, prevent progress from being made toward a
common transport policy, the Court held that they are ir-
relevant in the context of disputes under Article 175. Ar-
22' Id. at 7.
2411 Id.
2:1 Bombardella, supra note 220, at 2.
2.2 Proceedings, supra note 222, at 6.
EEC AIR TRANSPORT
ticle 175 makes no concessions to the degree of difficulty
involved for the institution to fulfill its obligation. The
Council is obligated to make a decision despite the diffi-
culty it may encounter.2 33
The Council does, however, retain the right to deter-
mine the objectives and means of attaining a common
transport policy in accordance with procedural rules laid
down in the Treaty. The Council has wide discretion with
regard to the substance and organization of the common
transport policy, limited only by procedural requirements
and specific time limits. 234 Thus, as a procedural matter,
if the Council is required to adopt a certain measure by a
qualified majority, as in Article 75, it cannot justify its fail-
ure to act because of lack of unanimity. 235
The Council is also required to act on the measures
specified by the Court within a "reasonable period. 23 6
The Court's determination that the Council must act
within a "reasonable" time is not sufficiently clear.237 Nor
has the Treaty set a time limit as to when action must oc-
cur. But a prolonged failure to act would be a further in-
fringement of the Treaty. 238
The Parliament was given the task of investigating the
legal consequences and developing definite views on the
legal situation that would arise if the Council were to fail
to act after being ordered to do so. If any legal measures
adopted by the Council were contrary to the establish-
ment of freedom to provide services required by the judg-
ment, the Council would be under a duty to amend its
legislation.239
While the Parliament's institutional position has been
strengthened by the fact that such an action is admissi-
2:.. Bombardella, supra note 220, at 3.
214 Proceedings, supra note 222, at 9.
2 .F Bombardella, supra note 220, at 3.
2361 Id.
2.47 Proceedings, supra note 222, at 7.
248 Bombardella, supra note 220, at 3.
2.. Wijsenbeek, supra note 225, at 3.
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ble,24 ° the Court cannot prescribe a transport policy and
cannot therefore render a judgment capable of enforce-
ment.24 ' The significance of this decision may best be de-
scribed as an official acknowledgment that the Council has
failed in its duty to provide a common transport policy,
and that the other bodies of the EEC government have
the right to obtain judicial review of the Council's activi-
ties. While the decision explicitly addressed only the
Council's obligations to develop a surface transport pol-
icy, its implications for air transport are manifest.
The Court of Justice has also recently ruled on other
cases which are of import to the EEC's obligations vis-a-
vis air transport. For example, in Commission v. French Re-
public, the Court held that all general provisions of the
Treaty of Rome apply to sea and air transport, even
though there are no regulations to enforce the laws.242
This decision suggests that the Commission could apply
the competition laws of the Treaty of Rome in those ar-
eas. 243 Without specific action by the Council, however,
there are no means whereby those competition laws may
be applied directly to sea and air transport. 44
The Commission has also taken a strong position on
this question, in the Association des Compagnies Aeriennes de la
Communaute Europeenne (ACE) complaint against Olympic
Airlines. Charges against Olympic followed in the wake of
charges against Sabena, which was accused of receiving
illegal government loan guarantees and subsidization of
depreciation charges and interest payments. The formal
complaint against Olympic alleged that it received subsi-
dies from the Greek government in the form of an exemp-
tion from paying landing fees at Greek airports. ACE
claimed that allowing one airline to avoid paying fees
2411 Id
24, Proceedings, supra note 222, at 10.
'4 2 Commission v. French Republic, 1974 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 359, [1974
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8270 (1975).
24:1 Dagtoglou, supra note 60, at 349.
244 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 84(2).
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"distorts or threatens to distort competition. '245 ACE's
complaint charged that the market distortion thereby cre-
ated violated Article 92(1), which mandates free and equal
trading opportunities throughout the Common Market.
ACE also alleged that the aid violated Article 7 which pro-
hibits discrimination on the basis of nationality.246 The
Commission held that, "There is no legal basis for claim-
ing, as Olympic Airways claims, that Articles 85 and 86 do
not apply to air transport. 24 7
The most recent Court of Justice opinion of relevance,
Nouvelles Frontie'res, involved the issue of whether member
nations have the right to regulate the price of airline tick-
ets sold within their borders. 248 The European Court an-
swered certified questions from a French court
concerning applicability of the competition rules of the
Treaty of Rome to price-fixing agreements by French air-
lines. 249 Nouvelles Fronti'res, a French travel agency, was
selling tickets at fares that had not been approved by the
French Government under the French Civil Aviation
Code.250 "In essence, the Court ruled that it is contrary to
... the Treaty to approve air tariffs where these tariffs are
the result of an agreement, a decision of an association of
undertakings [trade association] or a concerted practice
itself contrary to Article 85. ' 251
The Court first found that air transport, absent specific
language within the Treaty, was "subject to the general
rules of the Treaty, including the competition rules. 252
,4. EEC Claims Greek Airline Received Illegal Subsidies, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan.
17, 1983, at 34.
246 Id.
247 Commission Decision ofJan. 23, 1985, 28 o.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L46) 51, 52
(1985); P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 104.
24, Feazel, Liberalization Policies at Issue in Ruling in French Fare Case, Av. WK. &
SPACE TECH., July 15, 1985, at 28 [hereinafter Liberalization Policies].
24.. See generally Wassenbergh, The 'Nouvelles Frontires' Case, 11 AIR L. 161 (1986).
2." Haanappel, Colloquium 'Nouvelles Frontires, 'State University of Leyden, the Nether-
lands, 11 AIR L. 181 (1986).
2.51 Id.
2 Ministere Public v. Asjes (Nouvelles Frontires), 1986 Eur. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 65, 72, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at
16,772, 16,778 (1986).
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The Court then concluded that absent specific regulations
governing air transport adopted by the Council under Ar-
ticle 87, it was, in effect, up to the competent "authorities
in Member States" under Article 88 to apply the competi-
tion rules of the Treaty to agreements concerning the air
transport industry, or, alternatively, the Commission
could issue a "reasoned decision" under Article 89.253
But either option would open the Pandora's box of litiga-
tion in the national courts of Member States. 254
Novelles Frontieres represents the first "legal stick" avail-
able to the EEC Commission with which action may be
taken against anticompetitive practices among European
airlines. But Nouvelles Frontigres, while a philosophical vic-
tory for those seeking greater liberalization, was in fact a
practical defeat. Although the Court held that Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty of Rome specifically apply to air
transport, they create a right without a remedy until either
the Council adopts regulations or the Commission issues
a reasoned decision. Nonetheless, the decision intensified
the pressure on the Council to promulgate regulations to
keep Pandora's box closed.
These cases seem to indicate that the Member States of
the EEC are bound to follow the Treaty of Rome competi-
tion rules in the area of air transport. The holdings also
indicate the lack of enforcement power possessed by the
Court. At best, the Court ofJustice can be seen as a moral
institution without any genuine power to force compli-
ance with the Treaty.
3. The Commission
The Commission is a non-partisan body appointed by
the common agreement of the Member States. The Com-
mission functions closely with the Council, but acts inde-
pendently of the Council and Member States.255 The
Commission's duties are primarily executive in nature -
'1:1 Id. at 16,778-80.
2 See id. at 16,780; P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 104-06, 252.
2-' 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4472, 4482 (1987).
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to oversee EEC development and to ensure that the de-
velopment conforms to the Treaty of Rome. To fulfill its
role, the Commission issues recommendations and advi-
sory opinions to the Council for the consideration and
adoption of regulations.256 The Commission has specific
authority over infringement of competition laws. Article
89 gives the Commission investigatory powers.
257
The Commission has been the most active and impa-
tient body in the EEC government in pursuit of a trans-
port policy and liberalization of airline regulations. While
the Commission asserts that it does not believe the Ameri-
can style of deregulation would work in Europe, it advo-
cates a gradual change from existing policy, referred to as
the "go slow" approach. 258 Nonetheless, it has grown in-
creasingly impatient with the Council's inability to pro-
mulgate regulations applying the Treaty of Rome's
competition articles to air transport.
The Commission recognizes benefits derived from the
traditional regulatory system, but believes that improve-
ments are necessary. For instance, the Commission advo-
cates increased flexibility 25 9 and proposes liberalization of
capacity, air fares, and conditions of competition.26 °
The Commission wants to establish an environment
amenable to competition, recognizing that it cannot force
companies to compete. However, the Commission does
not feel that Article 85 should be fully implemented, be-
cause that would lead to total deregulation. In other
words, the Commission desires "to tilt the bargaining
power more to the advantage of innovation and market
behaviour where the present system tends to block such
action." 26 1
During the past decade, the Commission has issued sev-
eral memoranda which have put forth possible objectives
2r- 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4472 (1987).
'.57 Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 89.
2' S)rensen, supra note 23, at 6.
251 Id.
2-"1 Id. at 7.
2i I Id.
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the Council could adopt. In 1979, the Commission issued
Memorandum 1 which pointed out several problems of the
current structure, including a tendency towards high tar-
iffs due to governmental presence, limited fare flexibility
for holidays, and, most importantly, limited possibilities
for innovation.2 62
In March 1984, the Commission followed with Memo-
randum 2, entitled "Progress Towards the Development of
a Community Air Transport Policy. ' ' 2 63 Memorandum 2 ex-
panded on the ideas promulgated in Memorandum 1.264
The aims of Memorandum 2 were to review the develop-
ments since Memorandum 1, to propose an overall frame-
work for air transport in the Community, to put forth
legislative measures for the Council's adoption, and to
outline future work the Commission plans to pursue.265
The policies of Memorandum 2 focused on air transport
between Member States as an important part of the crea-
tion of a Common Market in aviation and the improve-
ment of the Common Market in general.266 However, the
Commission was not oblivious to the impact and impor-
tance of international aviation outside of the Community.
The memorandum recognized the impact of deregulation
in the United States, under the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978, and the need to establish a unified Community
posture toward international organizations and nonmem-
ber countries. 67 The Community's major scheduled air-
lines were earning 40 percent of their revenues in local
Europe, with about 25 percent of the total earned in the
Community. The remainder of their revenues were
earned on routes to other international destinations, es-
pecially on intercontinental routes.2 68 Recognizing that
262 Id. at 6.
21';. See generally MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 29; P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 100-
02.
2 ,4 Sorensen, supra note 23, at 5.
265 Id. at 6.
2'm MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 29, at I.
267 Id. at 12-13.
2" Id. at 9.
EEC AIR TRANSPORT
American-style deregulation would not work in the Euro-
pean context, the Commissioners sought to maintain the
existing system of regulation and agreement while intro-
ducing flexibility and the benefits of competition.269
Memorandum 2 asked the Member States to consider
proposals to increase competition by restricting the influ-
ence of governments on scheduled airline operations and
by introducing greater flexibility in their air service ar-
rangements, particularly in route access, designation, ca-
pacity, and fares. 270 The Commission asserted that all of
the proposals in the memorandum were interdependent,
and, therefore, must be adopted by both the Council and
the Commission and implemented as a package.27' While
the Commission recognized the time necessary for discus-
sion and implementation, it discouraged excessive delay
and expressly reserved its right of direct action against
airline practices in violation of the competition articles.272
In Memorandum 2, the Commission addressed several
specific areas for liberalization in Europe's highly regu-
lated scheduled air transport industry. Capacity guaran-
tees were to be reduced to no more than 25 percent,
273
although 50 percent had been the norm under typical bi-
lateral agreements. The document addressed pooling
agreements, where traffic and revenues are shared regard-
less of which carrier generates the traffic or earns the rev-
enue. 274  The Commission also proposed guidelines
designed to monitor state subsidies of airlines to ensure a
fair, competitive environment.27 5 Finally, in what has
since become a major issue in liberalization, the Commis-
sion sought to apply the competition rules, specifically Ar-
ticles 85-90 of the Treaty of Rome, to the scheduled air
Id. at I.
27,, Thaine, supra note 27, at 90.
271 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 29, at III.
272 Id.; Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, arts. 85-90.
27:' Thaine, supra note 27, at 93.
274 Id. at 94.
275 Id. at 95.
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transport industry.2 76 The Commission justified this as-
sertion, two years before Nouvelles Frontires, on the basis
of Court of Justice rulings in 1974 and 1978.277 Oppo-
nents argued against adjustments to the European civil
aviation regime on the grounds that such changes would
result in unacceptable impacts on international aviation
outside of the Community, but this rationale was rejected
by the Commission. Rather, the Commission insisted that
such steps would contribute to a "Community market in
aviation" and the "improvement of the internal market in
its wider sense. '2 78 Nevertheless, the Commission recog-
nized the repercussions of its proposals on the non-Com-
munity states of Europe in formulating its proposals.2 79
The Commission sought a qualified increase in competi-
tiveness throughout European civil aviation:
[R]ecent years have made it clear that although the pres-
ent regime has produced an extensive network of aviation
services, the rigidities of the system... give rise to an in-
creasing degree of public dissatisfaction. This criticism
(not all of which is justified) has tended to centre on the
civil aviation services provided within Europe; and the
Commission is confirmed in its view that within the Com-
munity there is scope for introducing more flexibility and
competition into the existing system without destroying it
or losing the benefits that it has brought about. Flexibility
is not, however, an end in itself. It should be regarded
rather as the means to improving the services to the con-
sumer and the profitability of the efficient and enterprising
airline. 80
The Commission's qualifications on competition in-
cluded a recognition of strong state interests in the sur-
vival of national airlines28 ' and recognition of a history of
..7,; Id. at 95-96.
1_7 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 29, at 17. Nouvelles Fronti,res was decided April
30, 1986. See supra notes 248-254 and accompanying text.
17, MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 29, at 21.
279 Id. at 22.
'' Id. at 21.
2' Id. at 22.
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competition in services within the industry, especially with
respect to charter airlines.282 In addition, the Commis-
sion explicitly acknowledged that the U.S.-style deregula-
tion would not work in Europe283 and that direct
comparisons of costs and fares between European and
similar U.S. routes were invalid. In particular, fuel, air
traffic control, and airport charges presented significant
cost elements which European airlines could not influ-
ence. 284 Memorandum 2 concluded that air fares in Europe
were not unreasonably related to costs, owing in large
part to the fact that only 40 percent of total costs are con-
trollable by the airlines. Nevertheless, the Commission
believed that changes in procedures related to the fixing
of airfares would result in a "wider range of fares. ' 285
Moreover, the belief was expressed that competitive pres-
sures would ultimately lead to lower airfares.2 6
Memorandum 2 expressed a general preference for an
"evolutionary approach ' 287 to a more competitive air
transport policy, rather than the more revolutionary pol-
icy adopted earlier by the United States. 88 While com-
prehensive deregulation arguably had merit in the large,
unified market of the United States, conditions in Europe
would not justify such an approach. 28 9 Additionally, the
United States had about 20 major air carriers, and the
government could take "a relaxed view on the fate of any
one of them," in contrast to the nationalized airlines and
international character of European aviation.290 The issue,
therefore, was whether the system could be modified suffi-
ciently to meet the needs of the European Community
while at the same time bringing to bear sufficient competi-
2'2 Id. at 23. Charter traffic within Europe accounts for 60% of all air travel. See
Europe's Air Cartel, ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 1986, at 23, 26.
283 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 29, at 26-27.
2 4 Id. at 24.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 27.
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tive pressures for the airlines to "control costs, increase
productivity and provide efficient and attractively priced
services to the user; and to enable the efficient and enter-
prising airline to benefit. . . .29 1 The Commission stated
that the principal measures to be taken were: (a) commu-
nity rules on certain aspects of bilateral agreements be-
tween Member States; (b) changes in methods for
settlement of air tariffs; and (c) action limiting the effect of
commercial and tariff agreements between airlines. 92
Regarding bilateral agreements, the Commission urged
elimination of mandatory pooling arrangements between
airlines. Also, they suggested rigid 50/50 traffic-sharing
agreements should be relaxed to where no one party is
guaranteed a traffic share of more than 25 percent in
agreements between Member States.2 93 "This would ...
permit a greater degree of competition and assure a Mem-
ber State that its airline would have as a safety net a level
of operation below which it could not fall without the con-
sent of its own government. 294
The principal features of bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments between airlines were identified as scheduling, ca-
pacity, revenue sharing, and tariff provisions. Even
though the Commission, as explained above, wanted to
prevent capacity agreements which were either mandatory
or required a strict 50/50 sharing, it recognized that in
some cases such agreements were desirable in order to
assure service in thin markets. On the other hand, the
Commission recognized that such agreements tended to
inure to the detriment of the more efficient airline. Conse-
quently, Memorandum 2 indicated that capacity agreements
should be permissible, but emphasized that any party
should be able to withdraw from such an agreement upon
giving reasonably short notice.295
291Id.
2112 Id. at 29.
2 3 Id. at 30.
214 Id.
295 Id. at 32-33.
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As with capacity sharing, the Commission also recog-
nized that pooling agreements could have desirable con-
sequences in encouraging carriers to operate outside of
profitable periods.29 6 At the same time, such agreements
may also restrict competition that otherwise might take
place, contrary to Article 85(1).297 Pooling agreements
between airlines were of two basic types: open pools
aimed at equalizing revenues (regardless of which carrier
actually earned the revenue) and limited pools which al-
most equalized revenue. The Commission was of the
opinion that revenue pools should be permitted in certain
limited circumstances.298 Open pools which distributed
revenues on the basis of capacity offered by the airlines
would be impermissible in any case.299 In order to be ex-
empted from the competition rules under Article 85(3),
such agreements must contribute to the improvement of
air transportation with a minimum of anticompetitive ef-
fect.300 However, the Commission's guideline in this area
was quite restrictive, limiting the transfer of revenue from
one airline to another to one percent of poolable reve-
nues. All other revenue-pooling arrangements would be
subject to "specific scrutiny in each case in order to deter-
mine whether they would qualify for exemption under ar-
ticle 85(3)."s °l
In what was probably its most noteworthy proposal, the
Commission recognized that airlines should be as free as
possible to determine what tariffs best suited their com-
mercial needs and should be able to set tariffs within cer-
tain predetermined "zones of reasonableness" without
governmental approval.3 0 2 In its "Amended Proposal for
a Council Directive," the Commission indicated the mini-
2"" Id. at 33.
2... Id.; Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 85(i).
' MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 29, at 33.
Id.; Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 85(3).
• MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 29, at 33, 34; Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art.
85(3).
"I" MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 29, at 34.
102 Id. at 31.
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mum acceptable range to be covered within the zones. 3
This proposal reflected recent developments in the eco-
nomic and regulatory environment, such as the agree-
ments between the United States and certain ECAC
countries for a given number of "reference tariffs," as well
as "zones of reasonableness. ' 30 4 Within the zones, the
following alternatives could be agreed upon: airlines
would be free to set fares without government interfer-
ence; or proposed fares would take effect unless both
countries disapproved ("double disapproval"); or pro-
posed fares would be subject to country of origin ap-
proval. While both governments in bilateral agreements
would be expected to consult and agree in setting the
zones of reasonableness, in case of a dispute between the
two governments concerning fares outside of the zone,
the country of origin would be able to determine the
fare.30 5
The tariff-setting proposals of Memorandum 2 also ex-
tended to agreements among airlines. The Commission
observed that most ICAO Member States recognized such
tariff consultations as an essential part of transport policy.
Such consultations restricted competition, but at the same
time had resulted in a "system [which] allowed the provi-
sion of reliable, high quality services to the consumer. "306
Tariff-setting arrangements would be permissible if they
*"confer[red] an equivalent advantage to the consumer,
[were] not unduly restrictive and ... a reasonable degree
of competition [was] ensured. 30 7 The Commission indi-
cated that these conditions would be met if:
i) airlines had an effective right of independent action,
both in terms of proposing tariffs independently of other
30. The proposal called for two "zones of flexibility," each with a minimum
range of 25 percent. The first zone was to "extend at least 15% on either side of
the existing air fare for economy class," and the other was to "be situated below
the first and cover restricted use air fares." Id. Annex II, art. 6 (4) & (5).






airlines, and in terms of freedom to implement such tar-
iffs, subject only to the [proposed] limited government
control ....
ii) The Member States concerned and the Commission
were enabled to participate as observers in tariff
consultations.° 8
Another major aspect of competition, market access,
was given inadequate and cursory treatment by the Com-
mission.30 9 While recognizing the dominance through-
out the EEC of large, national airlines, and that services to
the consumer would be improved with a proliferation of
smaller airlines, the Commission proposed only that the
smaller airlines be allowed to operate on bilateral routes
not presently utilized. 31 0 The Commission believed that
such steps could be taken without "significant damage" to
major airlines and without the detailed justification or rec-
iprocity ordinarily required.31 ' The Commission went
further and suggested that if the Member State desired,
such routes could be so utilized only after giving national
airlines rights of first refusal.3 1 2
The Commission also proposed tight control of state
aid and subsidies to encourage airlines to accept competi-
tion. Without guarantees that other airlines would com-
pete on the same level, airlines would be reluctant to join
an open market. 3 3 The Commission feared that unless
state aids were adequately controlled, implementation of
competition measures would result in a subsidy race -
competition being financed by Member States. This
would be prevented by application of the Treaty's state
aids rules in Articles 92 and 93, for which the Commission
30$ Id.
.' See Thaine, supra note 27, at 93; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
European Commission CivilAviation Memorandum No. 2, 10 AIR L. 99, 103 (1985) (pol-
icy declaration and response adopted by the Executive Board of the ICC on Dec.
3, 1984).
MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 29, at 43-44.
I1i Id.
.31 Id. at 44.
1' Sorensen, supra note 23, at 7.
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has responsibility. 4 Proper application of these rules
would result in advance disclosure of all proposed state
aids so that the Commission could take a position.31 5 The
Commission recognized that state aids may be appropri-
ate in certain circumstances in order to fulfill public ser-
vice obligations, compete with subsidized carriers from
third countries, overcome "particularly precarious" but
temporary financial problems, or to assist economically
underdeveloped regions.16 Assistance in the form of
"normal commercial transactions," such as loans, capital
or guarantees, would also be acceptable, although cases
would have to be examined individually to determine if
there was an impermissible aid element.3 7
As indicated previously, the primary concern and focus
of the Commission in Memorandum 2 was with the EEC.
Consequently, with regard to the international implica-
tions of its proposals, it reasserted the supremacy of Com-
munity law. Under Article 234,318 Member States must
take steps to eliminate provisions in agreements with
third countries inconsistent with forthcoming Community
aviation provisions. Nevertheless, the Commission
agreed that, given the legitimate priorities and programs
in third countries, especially non-Community members of
ECAC, some flexibility would be required.3 9 Accord-
ingly, the Commission had entered into cooperation
agreements under Article 229320 with ECAC and
Eurocontrol.
In spite of its general adherence to a phased, evolution-
ary implementation of policies, Memorandum 2 indicated
some signs of the Commission's growing impatience with
the situation. It suggested that any group exemptions
from the competition provisions should be limited to
:-1 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 29, at 36.
3 ld. at 37.
... Id. at 37, 38.
3 17 Id. at 38.
'" Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 234.
MEMORANDUm 2, supra note 29, at 50.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 229.
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seven years. 2 1 Additionally, even though the memoran-
dum identified exceptions to the prohibitions in Article
85(1) if certain objectives were manifest, such exceptions
would expire in a little less than eight years on December
31, 1991.322 The Commission called attention to propos-
als made to the Council in 1981 calling for directives and
regulations, upon which the Council still had not taken
action. 23 Finally, the Commission repeatedly reasserted
its right to take direct action, in certain circumstances,
against practices in violation of Treaty provisions. 24
In addition to the above matters, Memorandum 2 dis-
cussed a significant number of additional issues. 2 The
memorandum also attached six annexes which included
detailed proposals for Council action and guidelines re-
lated to the foregoing matters.3 6 Memorandum 2 was
more than a general indication of the Commission's posi-
tion and thoughts on European civil aviation. The memo-
randum was intended to provoke action by the Council
and serve as a comprehensive guide to achieving the pol-
icy goals contained therein.
Reaction to Memorandum 2 was mixed and inconclusive.
IATA and AEA, while agreeing as to the necessity of re-
form, published their own proposals which differed con-
siderably from Memorandum 2.327 Perceiving significant
threats to their economic well being, trade unions and air-
ports opposed Memorandum 2. By contrast, charter air-
lines and consumer groups voiced strong support for the
Commission proposals, particularly in areas approached
most warily by scheduled carriers .3 2  The European Par-
.-21 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 29, at 35.
-,22 Id. Annex III C.
s.., Id. at 16-17.
.24 Id. at III, 36, Annex III C.2.
.25 See id. at 13, 48 (aircraft noise), 14 (search and rescue), 15 (accident investi-
gation and interregional air services), 19, 42 (air freight transport), 43 (access to
market), 45 (non-scheduled services), 47 (social matters as related to Community
and aviation policies), 48 (research), 49 (general aviation).
326 Id. Annexes I - VI.
:,127 AIR TRANSPORT, supra note 95, at 52-53.
"121. Id. at 53.
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liament and the Economic and Social Committee con-
ducted extensive hearings and published comprehensive
reports which supported the overall thrust of Memorandum
2, but which proposed significantly different approaches
to many of the issues 9.3 2 The Council instituted a high-
level working group which met eight times before the end
of 1984. The efforts of the group culminated in a report
which "can be said to build on Memorandum No. 2, tak-
ing into account the views that had been expressed in the
interim. "330 On December 11, 1984, the Council en-
dorsed the report as a guideline for further actions and
arranged for additional study.331
The failure of the Council to adopt regulations imple-
menting Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome led the
Commission in 1986 to send letters to ten European air-
lines alleging that they had violated the Treaty by engag-
ing in price-fixing, capacity limitation, revenue pooling,
and restricted market entry. The Commission
threatened that failure of the airlines to cooperate to elim-
inate these anticompetitive practices would lead it to issue
a "reasoned decision" under Article 89, an alternative
which had been explicitly approved by the European
Court ofJustice earlier that year in Nouvelles Frontires. The
issuance of a "reasoned decision" by the Commission
would open a Pandora's box of litigation by private par-
ties in the national courts of Member States.
Hence, the ten airlines (i.e., Air France, Aer Lingus, Al-
italia, British Airways, British Caledonian, KLM, Luf-
thansa, Olympic, Sabena and SAS) had a strong incentive
to comply. Although some of the southern European air-
lines initially resisted meeting with DG-4 (the Commis-
sion ministry responsible for competition), 3 a more
S' Id. at 53-54.
'' Id. at 54.
" ld. at 55.
:12 EEC Commission Action Could Result in Suits Against 10 Large Carriers, Av. WK. &
SPACE TECH., July 14, 1986, at 35.
.:1 Alitalia Rejects EEC Request for Data on Operational Practices, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 17, 1986, at 39.
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strongly worded Commission letter in early 1987 advised
recalcitrant carriers that the Commission believed an ap-
parent infringement of the Treaty existed and that a "rea-
soned decision" would soon be forthcoming. This
ultimately brought all the carriers to the bargaining table.
During tense meetings in Brussels, Mr. Peter Sutherland
warned representatives of Alitalia, Lufthansa, and
Olympic that unless they agreed to join negotiations on
pricing liberalization, he would bring an action against
them in the European Court of Justice for operating an
illegal cartel. The carriers capitulated. 34
Yet, the informal understandings ultimately entered
into between the Commission and the airlines were sur-
prisingly modest in substance, allowing a great deal more
anticompetitive activity than would be tolerated in, for ex-
ample, the United States. As to pricing, the informal
agreements allowed a continuation of carrier discussions
regarding rates and permitted carriers to enter into volun-
tary rate agreements, so long as such discussions were not
conducted in secret, the results of the discussions would
not be binding upon any carrier participating in them, and
carriers retained the right of independent action to file a
tariff deviating from the rates agreed to. As to revenue
and capacity-pooling agreements, they would continue to
be tolerated so long as they were voluntary, they involved
a sharing of revenue of no more than one percent, and the
transfer of revenue went to the carrier providing off-peak
service. Slot allocation would be permitted so long as
concluded publicly. And, as to computer reservations sys-
tems, there would have to be equal access to the systems,
and they could not be biased.
Thus, the Commission effectively did an "end run"
around the Council, defining the perimeters of lawful vis-
Ai-vis unlawful carrier conduct when the Council had been
rendered immobile by an inability to reach a consensus on
regulations implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
:134 Merritt, EC Deregulation at Crossroads, Int'l Herald Tribune, June 15, 1987, at
9, col. 5.
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of Rome. Yet, the Commission's modest constriction of
anticompetitive behavior by air carriers surprised almost
everyone, because the Commission had previously done
so much "chest-beating."
4. The Council
The Council is comprised of representatives appointed
from each Member State who directly represent their
States' interests. 35 The Council has both legislative and
executive powers336 and is responsible for carrying out
the objectives of the Community and coordinating the
economic policies of Member States. 37 The Council can
give recommendations which are not binding on Member
States. It can also issue decisions, directives, and regu-
lations which are binding. 39 The Council adopts regula-
tions based upon recommendations and advisory
opinions from the Commission or Parliament. 40
In 1962, the Council adopted general competition
rules, but specifically exempted air and sea transport. On
June 30, 1968, the Council decided that competition laws
should be made applicable to transport by rail, road, and
inland waterway.34 ' Air and sea transport were excluded
because of the special attitude adopted toward these
methods of transport when the Treaty of Rome was
adopted in 1957.342 Indeed, Council Regulation No. 141
states specifically that Council Regulation No. 17, which
gives the Council the direct means of investigating viola-
tions of Articles 85 and 86 in transport and imposes pen-
alties for failure to comply, 343 does not apply to air
transport and related activities. 4 4 Maritime competition
'13 5 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4406.02 (1978).
L. HENKEN, supra note 9, at 1078.
.7 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4402.04 (1978).
'" 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4902.31 (1976).
.. 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4902.15, 4902.25 (1976).
34o 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4402 (1987).
2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2401-2634 (various dates) (Reg. No. 17).
1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1945.05 (1974).
.. P. MATHIJSEN, supra note 162, at 181-83.
Assocation of European Airlines, European Air Transport Policy - AEA Propos-
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rules were not adopted by the Council until December of
1986.
Many in Europe have implored the Council to adopt
regulations which would specify how the competition laws
would be applied and enforced. 4 5 However, the major
stumbling block in the adoption of competition regula-
tions for the airlines has been the desire of each nation to
guarantee the success of its own airlines. Because the
Council members represent the interests of their own
States, they must follow the policies of their governments,
many of which have been generally opposed to air trans-
port liberalization.346
Article 74 of the Treaty of Rome states that "[t]he
objectives of this Treaty shall... be pursued by the Mem-
ber States within the framework of a common transport
policy. 3 147 Furthermore, Article 75 of the Treaty directs
the Council to create common rules applicable to interna-
tional transport within the Member States.34 8 Despite a
strong push for liberalization by the Commission in 1979
and 1984, and an important decision by the EEC Court of
Justice in 1986, the Council has pleaded impossibility be-
cause of the complexity of the issues and dissent within
the Council itself.3 49 The Council, according to the Court
of Justice, must pursue the objective of establishing free-
dom to provide services in the field of transport.3 50
By mid-1987, the Council appeared poised to conclude
als, Sept. 27, 1985, at 14 (paper adopted by President's Special Assembly at
Brussels).
34.5 P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 246; Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 84(2).
34, P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 98.
.4, Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 74.
-14 Id. art. 75.
.4,1 See Bombardella, supra note 220, at 3.
." Proceedings, supra note 222, at 12. In 1978, the Council established a priority
program to address the problem of air transport. The Council's priorities in-
clude: control of nuisances, simplification of formalities, implementation of tech-
nical standards, implementation of provisions regarding aid and competition, and
mutual recognition of licenses. Other items of Council concern include: working
conditions, the right of establishment, improvements in inter-regional services,
search, rescue and recovery operations, and accident inquiries. S1rensen, supra
note 23, at 3.
1988] 671
672 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
a comprehensive agreement on defining the application of
relevant provisions of the Treaty of Rome to air transport.
In particular, it would have laid down detailed rules for
the application of the competition provisions - Articles
85 and 86. It would also have identified the group exemp-
tions to be allowed thereunder and included directives on
scheduled airline fares, capacity, and market access.
Specifically, the package would have eliminated secret
price-fixing, but allowed public and voluntary agreements
between carriers as to fares. As to entry, instead of being
restricted to regional routes between provincial airports,
the airlines would have been permitted to compete on
feeder routes between regional and hub airports. The 50-
50 capacity limitation agreements in many bilaterals
would have been reduced to 45-55 for the first two years
and 40-60 thereafter. Revenue pooling would be limited
to 1%, and be transferred to the carrier providing off-
peak service. Computer reservation systems were to be
open to all carriers without bias. The carriers would have
been granted block exemptions from the competition
rules to enable them to agree on certain joint operations,
such as scheduling.3 5 '
But the entire package, accepted in principle by all
Member States, foundered in mid-1987 on the question of
the inclusion of Gibraltar in the proposed arrangements
for route development.5 2 Newly admitted Spain exer-
cised its veto at the eleventh hour on an issue having vir-
tually nothing to do with air transport; Spain continues to
contest British sovereignty over Gibraltar and apparently
used this platform to reassert its position.
Although the mid-1987 agreement was scuttled by the
Spanish veto, the ability of the Council to reach a majority
resolution of such issues will henceforth be greatly facili-
tated by the weighted voting of Member States recently
-5 Merritt, supra note 334, at 9, 12, col. 4.
.1 Spain Blocks the Adoption of Air Deregulation in EC, Wall St. J., July 2, 1987, at
15, col. 6; Unfair Air Fares, EcONOMIST, July 4, 1987, at 16; Spain in Search of Europe,
ECONOMIST, July 18, 1987, at 43.
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permitted by the Single European Act. Thus, no single
nation can again unilaterally thwart the Council's ability
to promulgate rules by casting a veto as Spain did here.
As we will see below, the Single European Act may have
prompted Council agreement on a conservative liberaliza-
tion package in December 1987.
C. Goal of an Internal Market by 1992 and the Single
European Act
The foregoing analysis of the functions and activities of
the EEC governing bodies would not be complete without
an understanding of a major motivating force within the
EEC - the goal of a unified internal market, a European
Union, by 1992. 53 The Single European Act (SEA),
which took effect inJuly 1987, is intended to facilitate and
compel the creation of a European Union by this target
date. As we shall see, the SEA provision allowing majority
voting recently may have moved the Council to action on
air transport. This provision replaces the previous re-
quirenient of unanimity in Council decisions. 54
The attainment of a bona fide internal market in all eco-
nomic sectors, including aviation, requires not only the
removal of trade barriers, but also a "fusion of the mem-
bers into a single economic area ... extended to include
freedom of movement of workers, the right of establish-
ment, the free movement of services and capital, and a
common transport policy. ' 355 The Commission has as-
sumed a prominent role in urging and planning for the
eventuality of this economic and political unification. 5 6
1 Creation of Internal Market, 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 202.07 (1978)
(CCH Explanation) [hereinafter Internal Market]; see They've Designed the Future, and
It MightJust Work, EcONOMIST, Feb. 13, 1988, at 45-48 [hereinafter They've Designed
the Future].
.-4 Single European Act, 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 101.15 (1978) (CCH
Explanation) [hereinafter Single European Act].
. Internal Market, supra note 353, 202.07.
See Proposals Aim to Strengthen the Community's Internal Market, [1982-
1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,415 (1982) (information
memorandum from the Commission, June 1982); Commission Submits Program
for the Consolidation of the Internal Market, [1982-1985 Transfer Binder] Coin-
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In 1984, the Commission called attention to a marked
slowdown in the progress toward the internal market
throughout the 1970s. The Commission proposed the
creation of a comprehensive program for the achievement
of a genuine internal market.35 7 The program would in-
clude not just the simplification of procedures at intra-
Community frontiers, but rather the complete abolition of
procedural formalities at the borders.3 58 The Commis-
sion also stated that the internal market would be incom-
plete unless citizens of the European Community could
reside in other Member States even without economic
justification. 9
In June 1985, the Commission revealed the "White Pa-
per," a major proposal for progress toward an internal
market.36 0 This set of specific, detailed proposals was
submitted for consideration at the Council's Milan meet-
ing at the end of June. Reciting the Community's recog-
nized need for an internal market, the Commission
indicated that a definite target date and detailed plans had
been missing. As a result of its deliberations, the Com-
mission had set the "bold target" of completion of the in-
ternal market by 1992.361 In the bulletin announcing the
White Paper, the Commission recited the need for re-
moval of barriers in numerous sectors of the Community
and, among other matters, called for encouragement of
industrial cooperation and the removal of disruptive taxa-
tion schemes as well as the free movement of goods and
services. The Commisson noted that removal of barriers
to the flow of services had proceeded more slowly than
for goods, but reaffirmed and explained the importance of
service industries. Service industries included "tradi-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,595 (1984) (information memorandum from the Com-
mission, June 1984) [hereinafter Commission Submits Program].
-. 7 Commission Submits Program, supra note 356, 10,595.
358 Id.
359 Id.
.4- Completion of the Internal Market Sought by 1992, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.




tional" areas such as "banking, insurance, and
transport." 362
The Council meeting in Milan, for which the White Pa-
per was prepared, was the juncture at which firm Commu-
nity efforts commenced toward the creation and
implementation of the Single European Act.3 63  Ulti-
mately, the signatories of the SEA agreed to the target
date of December 31, 1992.64
The SEA is a treaty that grew out of efforts, initiated by
the European Council, to advance the European Commu-
nities toward a European Union. 63 In response to the
European Council's Solemn Declaration at Stuttgart in
June 1983, the first draft of the treaty was presented in
February 1984. The Act was signed by representatives of
the twelve Member States on February 4, 1986, but it did
not take effect until July 1, 1987, after ratification by all
Member States. 66 The majority of the Act's provisions
are amendments to the Treaty of Rome or new provisions
to be added to the Treaty. 6 7 The Act seeks to create a
genuine internal market in which the remaining barriers
to free movement of goods, persons, services and capital
are removed. 68 In signing the Act, the Member States
have committed themselves to establish an internal mar-
ket by December 31, 1992, although this is in reality only
362 Id.
3- Single European Act a Milestone on the Road Toward A European Union, 4
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,812 (1986) (CCH Comment) [hereinafter
Milestone].
3- Single European Act, supra note 354, 101.15.
.4- Id. The European Council grew out of previously unsuccessful meetings of
Heads of State and Government, starting in 1972, intended to solve economic,
social and political problems. At the original meetings in 1972, it was decided to
pursue the goal of attaining, by 1980, a European Union which would govern all
relations between the Member States. This goal was confirmed at the Paris Sum-
mit in December 1974. At that time, it was formally decided to conduct such
meetings three times a year and as otherwise necessary. These meetings were to
constitute the European Council, and their purpose was to pursue solutions to the
problems the ordinary Council could not solve. European Union, 1 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 101.13 (1978) (CCH Explanation).
4611 Single European Act, supra note 354, 101.15.
167 Milestone, supra note 363, 10,812.
- Single European Act, supra note 354, 101.15.
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a statement of political intent.369
The SEA makes a number of institutional changes in
the operation of the EEC. The role of the European Par-
liament will be expanded, and it will be granted some de-
gree of control over Council decisions. The role of the
Commission will also be expanded and changed, particu-
larly in regard to its interaction with the Parliament. The
Council will be allowed, at the request of the Court ofJus-
tice, to set up a court to hear, among other matters, ap-
peals brought from Commission decisions on
competition.3 0 A major barrier to the establishment of
an internal market has been removed by the replacement
of unanimous voting with qualified majority voting on a
number of subjects, including development of a common
transport policy.3 7' However, a significant obstacle to the
efficacy of majority voting remains in the right of veto
which each country maintains. 72 The right of veto, the
so-called Luxembourg compromise, was extracted by the
French in 1966 in order to terminate General DeGaulle's
"empty-chair" period, a boycott maintained to defend
French sovereignty.3 73 The SEA makes no provision for
this right, under which, if a Member State declares a
Council decision to be adverse to its vital national inter-
ests, and if enough other Members agree (which usually
happens), then the veto cannot be outvoted.3 74
Two years after issuing the White Paper, in a second
annual report, the Commission stated that "[t]he Com-
munity must do better" in order to achieve an internal
market by 1992. The Commission recited numerous fail-
ures in itself, the Council, and Parliament to keep up with
workloads, but looked with optimism to the improved de-
cision making to be implemented through the Single Eu-
Id.; Milestone, supra note 363, 10,812.
3711 Milestone, supra note 363, 10,812.
I7 d.; Single European Act, supra note 354, 101.15.
472 Don't Take Europa, supra note 133, at 55; Milestone, supra note 363, 10,812.
.1. Don't Take Europa, supra note 133, at 55.
174 Id. The article adds that "[t]he veto power is often abused." Id.; see also
Milestone, supra note 363, 10,812.
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ropean Act. The Commission stressed the importance of
cooperative and expeditious involvement by officials of
Member governments and the necessity of not letting
"national and sectoral interests take over. ' 375 In these
movements toward an internal market, the Commission
has recognized the importance of a unified transport pol-
icy. Considering the importance of commercial aviation
in the transportation infrastructure, initiatives directed to-
ward liberalized competition and flexibility will assume
critical importance.
D. The Transition to Liberalization of European Air
Transport: 1988-1992
In December 1987, the EEC Council adopted its long
awaited regulations on the application of the Treaty of
Rome's competition rules to scheduled air transport,37 6
group exemptions thereto,377 a directive on scheduled air
fares, 378 and a decision on capacity sharing and market
access.
3 79
So why, after so many years of wrangling, had the
Council finally achieved agreement? The political
problems between Spain and the United Kingdom sur-
rounding the U.K.'s possession of Gibraltar, which had
led Spain to veto the agreement earlier in the year, were
resolved in December 1987.80 Moreover, the prospect of
weighted voting under the Single European Act had alle-
viated the possibility of a single state veto. Hence, no one
37.1 Faster Rate of Progress in the Completion of the Internal Market Needed, 4
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,882 (1987) (information memo from the Com-
mission, May 1987).
376 Council Regulation on the Application of the Competition Rules (Proce-
dural Provisions), Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3975/87 of 14 Dec. 1987, infra
Appendix A.
.,7 Council Regulation on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Rome Treaty
(Group Exemptions), Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3976/87 of 14 Dec. 1987,
infra Appendix B.
-.7. Council Directive on Scheduled Air Fares of 14 Dec. 1987, infra Appendix C.
:379, Council Decision on Capacity Sharing and Market Access of 14 Dec. 1987,
infra Appendix D.
.1 The Rock Stands Aside, ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1987, at 55.
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nation could repeat the Spanish impasse of Summer 1987.
With weighted voting, consensus became more practical
than intransigence.
Threats by the Commission to utilize the sanctions ap-
proved by the Court of Justice in Nouvelles Frontieres had
abated considerably with the relatively conservative agree-
ments it had entered into with offending airlines. And the
Commission itself began to appreciate the difficult polit-
ical problems that international aviation posed for Mem-
ber States, and was willing to opt for increased diplomacy
over unilateral actions which might rip at the very threads
of the fragile European alliance. 8'
Across the Atlantic, the American experiment in dereg-
ulation was beginning to turn sour. This was dampening
enthusiasm for radical liberalization in Europe. Even the
most liberal of the EEC members, Britain and the Nether-
lands, appeared to back off of their effort to accomplish
American-style deregulation.
Moreover, much of air transport had already been made
more liberal, with the new bilateral air transport agree-
ments in effect between Britain, the Netherlands, Ireland
and many of their aviation partners. 82 ECAC itself had
adopted modest liberalization proposals. Hence, there
was already much for the European scheduled air trans-
port industry to digest.
Charter services, which had largely been deregulated in
the 1950s, dominated more than half of the air passenger
market, 3 and intercity rail services were also responsible
for a sizable portion of the market. And with increased
privatization of carriers such as British Airways and
KLM, 384 and proposed mergers in the offing (such as that
As Peter Sutherland, EC Commissioner for competition, noted, "it was bet-
ter to move this way than by confrontation, which would have taken longer and
involved protracted legal battles." Carey & Wolf, EC Adopts Plan to Partly Deregulate
Europe's Airline Industry Starting in '88, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1987, at 24, col. 2.
*2 See P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 102-04.
: Id. at 99.
.14 British Airways was completely privatized by the Thatcher government.
KLM's government holdings have been reduced to 39%. P. Haanappel, A Decade
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announced between British Airways and British Caledo-
nian), the market was already increasingly competitive.
All of this made political consensus on a more con-
servative package, one more palatable to southern Euro-
pean governments, easier to achieve. The package itself,
effective January 1, 1988, provides for a three year transi-
tion, ostensibly attempting to meet the Community's am-
bitious 1992 deadline for a unified internal market. 85
Yet, for reasons expressed below, even the date for elimi-
nation of all internal barriers to aviation may be
unrealistic.
The original Council regulations excluded the trans-
port sector from the application of the competition
rules. 86 Hence, the Regulation on the Application of the Com-
petition Rules38 7 is the first to apply Articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty of Rome to air transport. Under it, the Com-
mission is explicitly conferred jurisdiction to hear com-
plaints regarding violations of Articles 85(1) and 86
brought by member governments or by natural or legal
persons having a legitimate interest. 388 It is given powers
of investigation,3 89 and the authority to levy fines against
enterprises found to have violated the Treaty.390
Article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome authorizes the es-
tablishment of group exemptions from the competition
rules, and the Council adopted regulations implementing
procedures for their creation.3 9 ' Here again, the Com-
mission is explicitly conferred significant powers to adopt
of Deregulation, Address before the Aviation & Space Law Section of the Ass'n of
American Law Schools 10 (Miami, Fla., Jan. 9, 1988) [hereinafter P. Haanappel].
See They've Designed the Future, supra note 353, at 45.
Pursuant to Council Regulation No. 141, Regulation No. 17 was made inap-
plicable to transportation. Subsequently, the Council adopted Regulation No.
10 17/68 to apply the competition rules to inland transport. And more recently, it
adopted Regulation No. 4056/86, applying the rules to maritime services. See P.
DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 245; Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4056/86 of 22 December
1986, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 378) 4 (1986).
.", See infra app. A.
Id. art. 3. Exceptions for technical agreements are set forth at id. art. 2.
Id. art. 11.
Id. art. 12(2).
See infra app. B.
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regulations authorizing carriers to engage in, inter alia, ca-
pacity and revenue sharing, agreements regarding pric-
ing, slot allocations, computer reservations systems, and
ground handling.39 2 Significantly, revenue pooling3 93 is
limited to one percent of the revenue earned on a route,
with the transfer being made to the carrier suffering a loss
because it is scheduling its flights at less busy times.394
Hence, revenue pooling has been substantially
circumscribed.
The Council's Directive on Scheduled Air Fares 395 gives to
the aeronautical authorities of Member States the jurisdic-
tion to approve carrier rates. 96 Rates shall be approved if
"they are reasonably related to the long-term fully allo-
cated costs" of the carrier. 97 They shall not be disap-
proved on grounds that the proposed rate "is lower than
that offered by another air carrier operating on the route
.... 398 Moreover, the Directive establishes two zones of
pricing flexibility - a discount zone, extending from 90%
to more than 65% of the referenced fare; and a deep-dis-
count zone, running from 65% to 45% of the referenced
fare.39 9 Although the conditions attached to these fares
are rigid (e.g., advance purchase requirements, minimum
and maximum lengths of stay, and age restrictions) 40 0
within these zones, carriers may set their prices freely
without government restrictions.40 '
And finally, in the Council Decision on Capacity Sharing
and Market Access,40 2 the traditional 50-50% split of capac-
ity between European carriers is abandoned in favor of an
492 Id. art. 2.
311: See P. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 64.
.. See infra app. B, art. 2.
. See infra app. C.
Id. art. 4.
I ld. art. 3.
IlsId.
I' ld. art. 5. The "referenced fare" is the "normal economy air fare charged by
a third- or fourth-freedom air carrier on the routes in question... Id. art. 2(c).
Id. Annex II.
Id. art. 5.
See infra app. D.
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immediate 55-45% rule (from January 1, 1988, to Sep-
tember 30, 1989), and then a 60-40% split (after October
1, 1989). 4  However, the Decision includes an escape
clause, enabling any Member State to petition the Com-
mission to postpone or cancel the 60-40% rule on
grounds that its flag carriers have suffered "serious finan-
cial damage. "404
The Decision also established new entry opportunities
of multiple designation over routes having more than
250,000 passengers, with this threshold of passengers be-
ing reduced in the second and third year to 200,000 (or
1,200 return flights), and 180,000 (or 1,000 return
flights), respectively.4 °5 And significant new opportunities
for entry have been created between hub and regional
airports.40 6
The package has been characterized as "a watered
down version of earlier pro-deregulation proposals [e.g.,
Memorandum 2] made by the EEC Commission. 40 7
Others described the new rules as "extremely modest. 4
0 8
Modest perhaps, from an American perspective. But
these new rules, coupled with the new liberal European
bilateral air transport agreements, the competition engen-
dered by U.S. - flag carriers traversing the Atlantic, the
new ECAC rules, the rash of privatization and mergers,
and the significant competition provided by European
charter carriers, suggests that the environment is hardly
the protectionist, cartel atmosphere of the 1970s. While
falling short of the ambitious proposals of Memorandum 2,
tremendous progress has been made.
And that the Europeans want to take a gradual ap-
proach to liberalization, rather than the hog wild, compre-
hensive lightning speed deregulation of the United
4,,. Id. art. 3.
4,,4 Id. art. 4.
4". Id. art. 5.
406 Id. art. 6.
407 P. Haanappel, supra note 384, at 11.
408 Carey & Wolf, supra note 381, at 24, col. 1.
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States,40 9 suggests that EEC leaders are more prudent
than their brash American cousins, and more willing to
learn from the failures of a blind adherence to the ideol-
ogy of laissez faire.41
There are, by the way, some interesting paradoxes in
the perspectives on both sides of the ocean. A recent poll
revealed that Europeans, who have not yet experienced
airline deregulation, favor it by a margin of four to one.
In contrast, Americans, who have had about a decade of
it, favor it by a margin of only 1.6 to one.4 11 Apparently,
the grass is greener on the other side of the Atlantic.
VII. GAZING INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL: THE PROSPECTUS
FOR EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL AVIATION
The year 1992 may well be too ambitious a target for
comprehensive European unification of the nature in-
tended by the SEA. Nonetheless, since unification may be
achieved eventually, the relevant question here is what
this will mean for air transport. All nations have tradition-
ally guarded their sovereignty over aviation, allowing air-
lines owned by foreign nationals to enter their own
markets only on a reciprocal basis, carefully negotiated in
a series of bilateral air transport agreements.
Today Phillips, the Dutch electronics firm, can build a
manufacturing facility in Barcelona with relative ease. But
if KLM Royal Dutch Airlines sought to establish hub-and-
spoke operations centered in Barcelona, the Spanish Air
Force would likely be scrambled to escort the KLM jets
out of sovereign Spanish airspace. Nevertheless, if Eu-
rope is to achieve a unified economy, shouldn't KLM have
the freedom to enter and exit markets that Phillips en-
joys? If so, then the traditional notion of air sovereignty,
and the complex matrix of bilateral air transport agree-
ments which codify the concept, must be superseded by a
4'11 See Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of The Civil Aeronautics Board - Opening Wide the
Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP. LJ. 91 (1979).
4.. See infra notes 418-420 and accompanying text.
I,, P. Haanappel, supra note 384, at 12.
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regime which treats all of the EEC as a domestic cabotage
market. If this occurs, Lufthansa will be able to make a
hub of Lyon, and Air France a hub of Munich, as they
choose, without governmental interference.
Another traditional concept which already appears to
be crumbling is the notion of "effective ownership and
control" of a flag-carrier by citizens of its nation. For ex-
ample, where the Ireland-Portugal bilateral air transport
agreement allowed a carrier flying the flag of each nation
to serve the Dublin-Lisbon market, it was required that
each nation's carrier be effectively owned and controlled
by citizens of the nation whose flag the airline flew. Thus,
more than 50% of Aer Lingus is owned by Irish nationals,
and more than 50% of TAP is owned by Portuguese. This
was a concept which had long dominated the air transport
relations of most nations, although a few multinational
carriers existed here and there, the most notable among
them being the Scandinavian Airline System (SAS), a con-
sortium of Scandinavian nations.
With their eyes on the U.S. megacarriers which have
emerged from American deregulation (where fewer than a
half-dozen airlines control more than 80% of the U.S. do-
mestic market), privatization and merger discussions be-
tween carriers have become increasingly popular in
Europe. Already, SAS has announced (and subsequently
abandoned) plans to merge with Sabena, and recently
privatized British Airways has announced its intention to
acquire British Caledonian, also a target of SAS.4 12 Al-
italia has also expressed an interest in securing a merger
partner.
Today, the five largest EEC airlines (i.e., British Air-
ways, Air France, Lufthansa, KLM, and Iberia) account for
412 Hemp, British Airways Wins Caledonian By Increasing Bid to $457.9 Million, Wall
St. J., Dec. 22, 1987, at 18, col. 1; Hemp, SAS Bids for Part of British Caledonian,
Which Favors the Offer Over British Air's, Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1987, at 18, col. 1;
Marcom, U.K. to Review British Air Plan for a Takeover, Wall St. J, Aug. 7, 1987, at
20, col. 1; Merritt, For EC 'Flag Carriers, 'Partnerships May Be a Necessity, Int'l Herald
Tribune, June 15, 1987, at 9, col. 2.
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nearly 70% of scheduled European traffic.4 13 Jan Carlzon,
president of SAS, predicts that ultimately only five airlines
will survive liberalization and wants SAS to be among
them.414 The global impact of deregulation is predicted
to result in a consolidation of the industry into 15 to 20
multinational airlines, competing in markets around the
world. 415
If the U.S. experience is any indication of what will oc-
cur in a liberalized regulatory environment in Europe,
bankruptcies, consolidations, and mergers will result in a
highly concentrated group of multinational European
megacarriers, all utilizing hub-and-spoke operations and
linked to only a few sophisticated computer reservations
systems.41 6 In the short run, passengers will enjoy lower
ticket prices, as carriers become hotly competitive, more
efficient, and economical, because their profit margins will
be severely squeezed by new entrants. 4 17 Those benefits
will be enjoyed at the cost of deterioration in labor-man-
agement relations, the margin of safety, small community
access, and an overall decline in the quality of airline ser-
vice.41 8 Many smaller carriers and most new entrants will
413 European Deregulation Expected to Lead to Airline Mergers, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Mar. 9, 1987, at 203. British Airways alone accounts for 22% of all EEC
revenue passenger miles, even without its acquisition of British Caledonian. Id.
414 Carey, European Airlines Discuss Joining Forces, Wall St. J., June 10, 1987, at 16,
col. 3.
4 Kasper, Toward Open Skies World-Wide, Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1987, at 17.
4- The emergence of European computer reservations systems (CRS) has al-
ready begun, with British Airways, KLM, and Swissair linking themselves in a joint
venture with United Airlines, and its Covia reservations system. Rose, Allegis Aims
for More Profit, Passengers with European Reservations Venture, Wall St.J.,July 13, 1987,
at 2, col. 2. Recently, Allegis announced its intention to sell 35% of its Covia
system to British Airways, Swissair, KLM and Alitalia. Allegis Discloses More on 500
Sale of Its Covia Unit, Wall St.J., Feb. 19, 1988, at 36, col. 2. Meanwhile, Air France,
Lufthansa, Iberia and SAS have teamed with Texas Air's System One CRS to form
the Amadeus computer reservations system.
4, Dempsey, The Experience of Deregulation: Erosion of the Common Carrier System, 13
TRANSP. L. INST. 121, 172-75 (1980) [hereinafter Experience of Deregulation].
41m Dempsey, The Dark Side of Deregulation: Its Impact on Small Communities, 39 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 445 (1987); Turbulence, supra note 23, at 387-88; Dempsey, Transporta-
tion Deregulation - On a Collision Course?, 13 TRANSP. L.J. 329, 342-64 (1984);
Dempsey, With Deregulation, Big Get Bigger, Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 19, 1987, at
9A; Dempsey, Deregulation's First Decade, J. of Commerce, Dec. 18, 1987, at 8A;
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fall into bankruptcy, unless they can align themselves as
feeders for the megacarriers. 41 9 The charter airline indus-
try will shrink radically or disappear. And once the re-
maining airlines have achieved consolidation into a
handful of megacarriers, ticket prices will soar.4 2 °
VIII. CONCLUSION
The enthusiasm for liberalization has waned somewhat
as Europeans have observed the massive shakeout occur-
ring across the Atlantic in the decade-old American ex-
periment in deregulation. Nevertheless, nations such as
Britain and the Netherlands, which believe both consum-
ers and airlines will ultimately benefit from the forces of
the marketplace, have continued to exert considerable
pressure for liberalization. 42' The increasing number of
liberal bilateral agreements is evidence that the European
nations are creating a more free market-oriented air trans-
port system. Individual airlines are also taking direct ac-
tion against restraints to air transport. Nations and
airlines opposed to deregulation are being increasingly
subjected to market forces to which they must respond or
risk losing ground to the more flexible, less-regulated
Dempsey, Punishing Smallness, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 12, 1987, at 15A;
Rowen, Airline Service Has Gone to Hell, Washington Post, July 23, 1987, at A21, col.
1; Dempsey, Consumers Pay More to Receive a Lot Less, USA Today, July 16, 1987, at
8A.
4,9 Dempsey, Antitrust Law & Policy in Transportation: Concentration I$ the Name of
the Game, 21 GA. L. REV. 505 (1987); Dempsey, Birth of the Monster Airlines, TRAFFIC
WORLD, Dec. 1, 1986, at 77; Rose, Major U.S. Airlines Rapidly Gain Control Over
Regional Lines, Wall St.J., Feb. 17, 1988, at 1, col. 6; Dempsey, Deregulation Brings
Flying Low, Rocky Mountain News, Aug. 9, 1987, at 73; Dempsey, The Carnage of
Airline Deregulation, Houston Chronicle, July 30, 1987, at 27; Dempsey, Consolida-
tion a Destructive Trend, Denver Post, Dec. 6, 1986, at 4B, col. 1; Dempsey, Deregula-
tion's Toll Is Rising, Denver Post, Sept. 4, 1986, at 5B, col. 4; Dempsey, Deregulated
Skies Unfriendly to SmallAirlines, Rocky Mountain News, May 25, 1986, at 77, col. 1;
Dempsey, Airline Deregulation's Hostile Skies, Denver Post, Oct. 17, 1983, at 3B, col.
3; Dempsey, Stormy Skies of Deregulation, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 14, 1983, at 19, col.
1; Dempsey, Affordability, Safety of Airlines May Suffer, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 11,
1983, at 7, col. 1; Rowen, Airline Deregulation: A Bankrupt Policy, Washington Post,
Sept. 29, 1983, at A21; see P. DEMPSEY & W. THOMS, supra note 21, at 245-51.
42o Experience of Deregulation, supra note 417, at 174.
4.2 Increased Liberalization, supra note 17, at 36.
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States and increasingly privatized carriers. Industry orga-
nizations have tremendous influence in the European air
transport industry, and ECAC has made significant strides
toward liberalization with its recent Memoranda of Un-
derstanding on tariffs and capacity. Although the inter-
ests and objectives of each organization are different,
there is growing support for modest liberalization from
these bodies, as well.
The European Economic Community was designed to
promote a free market among Member States. Actions by
the EEC have been delayed by political considerations
and by the reluctance of a few nations that own or subsi-
dize their national airlines.422 While unable to accomplish
immediate deregulation, the EEC has helped generate
public support that is pressuring governments towards
more bilateral agreements to ease regulation.42 3 Through
its governing bodies, the EEC is contributing to the crea-
tion of a governmental climate favoring at least partial de-
regulation. Much progress has been achieved toward that
objective with the Council's promulgation of its long-
awaited regulations, group exemptions, directive and de-
cision, reproduced in the ensuing pages of this article.
Although it is far from clear what the final result of
these forces favoring liberalization of air transport regula-
tion will be, and whether deregulation can be achieved by
1992, it is obvious that a significant liberalization in the
regulatory environment of European air transport is oc-
curring and that this trend is likely to continue. Let us
only hope that Europe learns from the American experi-
ence with deregulation and does a better job of it than we
have on this side of the Atlantic.42 4
422 Liberalization Policies, supra note 248, at 28.
4,. New Agreements, supra note 37, at 76.




COUNCIL REGULATION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE
COMPETITION RULES
(PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS)
COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 3975/87
of 14 December 1987
laying down the procedure for the application of the rules
on competition to undertakings in the air transport sec-
tor*
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community, and in particular Article 87
thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission',
Having regard to the Opinions of the European
Parliament 2,
Having regard to the Opinion of the Economic and Social
3Committee ,
Whereas the rules on competition form part of the
Treaty's general provisions which also apply to air trans-
port; whereas the rules for applying these provisions are
either specified in the Chapter on competition or fall to be
determined by the procedures laid down therein;
Whereas, according to Council Regulation No 14 14,
Council Regulation No 175 does not apply to transport
services; whereas Council Regulation (EEC) No 1017/686
* [Ed. - Throughout Appendices A - D, the editors have duplicated, with minor
variations in spacing, the citation form used in the footnotes to the original Coun-
cil documents. Therefore, citations throughout these Appendices will not con-
form with A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (14th ed. 1986). Whereas the Council
documents began with footnote number one on each new page which contained a
footnote, the editors have renumbered the footnotes to make them consecutive.]
1 OJ No C 182, 9.7.1984, p. 2.
2 OJ No C 182, 19.7.1982, p. 120 and OJ No C 345, 21.12.1987.
- OJ No C 77, 21.3.1983, p. 20.
40J No 124, 28.11.1962, p. 2751/62.
OJ No 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204/62.
OJ No L 175, 23.7.1968, p. 1.
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applies only to inland transport; whereas Council Regula-
tion (EEC) No 4056/867 applies only to maritime trans-
port; whereas consequently the Commission has no
means at present of investigating directly cases of sus-
pected infringement of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty in
air transport; whereas moreover the Commission lacks
such powers of its own to take decisions or impose penal-
ties as are necessary for it to bring to an end infringe-
ments established by it;
Whereas air transport is characterized by features which
are specific to this sector; whereas, furthermore, interna-
tional air transport is regulated by a network of bilateral
agreements between States which define the conditions
under which air carriers designated by the parties to the
agreements may operate routes between their territories;
Whereas practices which affect competition relating to air
transport between Member States may have a substantial
effect on trade between Member States; whereas it is
therefore desirable that rules should be laid down under
which the Commission, acting in close and constant liai-
son with the competent authorities of the Member States,
may take the requisite measures for the application of Ar-
ticles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to international air trans-
port between Community airports;
Whereas such a regulation should provide for appropriate
procedures, decision-making powers and penalties to en-
sure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Arti-
cles 85(1) and 86 of the Treaty; whereas account should
be taken in this respect of the procedural provisions of
Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68 applicable to inland trans-
port operations, which takes account of certain distinctive
features of transport operations viewed as a whole;
Whereas undertakings concerned must be accorded the
right to be heard by the Commission, third parties whose
interests may be affected by a decision must be given the
opportunity of submitting their comments beforehand
70J No L 378, 31.12.1986, p. 4.
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and it must be ensured that wide publicity is given to deci-
sions taken; '
Whereas all decisions taken by the Commission under this
Regulation are subject to review by the Court of Justice
under the conditions specified in the Treaty; whereas it is
moreover desirable, pursuant to Article 172 of the Treaty,
to confer upon the Court of Justice unlimited jurisdiction
in respect of decisions under which the Commission im-
poses fines or periodic penalty payments;
Whereas it is appropriate to except certain agreements,
decisions and concerted practices from the prohibition
laid down in Article 85(1) of the Treaty, insofar as their
sole object and effect is to achieve technical improve-
ments or co-operation;
Whereas, given the specific features of air transport, it will
in the first instance be for undertakings themselves to see
that their agreements, decisions and concerted practices
conform to the competition rules, and notification to the
Commission need not be compulsory;
Whereas undertakings may wish to apply to the Commis-
sion in certain cases for confirmation that their agree-
ments, decisions and concerted practices conform to the
law, and a simplified procedure should be laid down for
such cases;
Whereas this Regulation does not prejudge the applica-
tion of Article 90 of the Treaty,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
Scope
1. This Regulation lays down detailed rules for the ap-
plication of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to air trans-
port services.
2. This Regulation shall apply only to international air
transport between Community airports.
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Article 2
Exceptions for certain technical agreements
1. The prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) of the
Treaty shall not apply to the agreements, decisions and
concerted practices listed in the Annex, insofar as their
sole object and effect is to achieve technical improve-
ments or co-operation. This list is not exhaustive.
2. If necessary, the Commission shall submit proposals
to the Council for the amendment of the list in the Annex.
Article 3
Procedures on complaint or on the Commission's own
initiative
1. Acting on receipt of a complaint or on its own initia-
tive, the Commission shall initiate procedures to termi-
nate any infringement of the provisions of Articles 85(1)
or 86 of the Treaty.
Complaints may be submitted by:
(a) Member States;
(b) natural or legal persons who claim a legitimate
interest.
2. Upon application by the undertakings or associations
of undertakings concerned, the Commission may certify
that, on the basis of the facts in its possession, there are
no grounds under Article 85(1) or Article 86 of the Treaty
for action on its part in respect of an agreement, decision
or concerted practice.
Article 4
Result of procedures on complaint or on the
Commission's own initiative
1. Where the Commission finds that there has been an
infringement of Articles 85(1) or 86 of the Treaty, it may
by decision require the undertakings or associations of
undertakings concerned to bring such an infringement to
an end.
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Regula-
tion, the Commission may address recommendations for
EEC AIR TRANSPORT
termination of the infringement to the undertakings or as-
sociations of undertakings concerned before taking a de-
cision under the preceding subparagraph.
2. If the Commission, acting on a complaint received,
concludes that, on the evidence before it, there are no
grounds for intervention under Articles 85(1) or 86 of the
Treaty in respect of any agreement, decision or concerted
practice, it shall take a decision rejecting the complaint as
unfounded.
3. If the Commission, whether acting on a complaint re-
ceived or on its own initiative, concludes that an agree-
ment, decision or concerted practice satisfies the
provisions of both Article 85(1) and 85(3) of the Treaty, it
shall take a decision applying paragraph 3 of the said Arti-
cle. Such a decision shall indicate the date from which it
is to take effect. This date may be prior to that of the
decision.
Article 5
Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty Objections
1. Undertakings and associations of undertakings which
wish to seek application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty in
respect of agreements, decisions and concerted practices
falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the said Ar-
ticle to which they are parties shall submit applications to
the Commission.
2. If the Commission judges an application admissible
and is in possession of all the available evidence and no
action under Article 3 has been taken against the agree-
ment, decision or concerted practice in question, then it
shall publish as soon as possible in the OfficialJournal of the
European Communities a summary of the application and in-
vite all interested third parties and the Member States to
submit their comments to the Commission within 30 days.
Such publications shall have regard to the legitimate in-
terest of undertakings in the protection of their business
secrets.
3. Unless the Commission notifies applicants, within 90
days of the date of such publication in the OfficialJournal of
1988] 691
692 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
the European Communities, that there are serious doubts as
to the applicability of Article 85(3) of the Treaty, the
agreement, decision or concerted practice shall be
deemed exempt, insofar as it conforms with the descrip-
tion given in the application, from the prohibition for the
time already elapsed and for a maximum of six years from
the date of publication in the Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Communities.
If the Commission finds, after expiry of the 90 day time
limit, but before expiry of the six-year period, that the
conditions for applying Article 85(3) of the Treaty are not
satisfied, it shall issue a decision declaring that the prohi-
bition in Article 85(1) applies. Such decision may be ret-
roactive where the parties concerned have given
inaccurate information or where they abuse an exemption
from the provisions of Article 85(1) or have contravened
Article 86.
4. The Commission may notify applicants as referred to
in the first subparagraph of paragraph 3; it shall do so if
requested by a Member State within 45 days of the for-
warding to the Member State of the application in accord-
ance with Article 8(2). This request must be justified on
the basis of considerations relating to the competition
rules of the Treaty.
If it finds that the conditions of Article 85(1) and (3) of
the Treaty are satisfied, the Commission shall issue a deci-
sion applying Article 85(3). The decision shall indicate
the date from which it is to take effect. This date may be
prior to that of the application.
Article 6
Duration and revocation of decisions applying
Article 85(3)
1. Any decision applying Article 85(3) of the Treaty
adopted under Articles 4 or 5 of this Regulation shall in-
dicate the period for which it is to be valid; normally such
period shall not be less than six years. Conditions and ob-
ligations may be attached to the decision.
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2. The decision may be renewed if the conditions for ap-
plying Article 85(3) of the Treaty continue to be satisfied.
3. The Commission may revoke or amend its decision or
prohibit specific acts by the parties:
(a) where there has been a change in any of the facts
which were basic to the making of the decision; or
(b) where the parties commit a breach of any obligation
attached to the decision; or
(c) where the decision is based on incorrect information
or was induced by deceit; or
(d) where the parties abuse the exemption from the pro-
visions of Article 85(1) of the Treaty granted to them
by the decision.
In cases falling under subparagraphs (b), (c) or (d), the
decision may be revoked with retroactive effect.
Article 7
Powers
Subject to review of its decision by the Court of Justice,
the Commission shall have sole power to issue decisions
pursuant to Article 85(3) of the Treaty.
The authorities of the Member States shall retain the
power to decide whether any case falls under the provi-
sions of Article 85(1) or Article 86 of the Treaty, until
such time as the Commission has initiated a procedure
with a view to formulating a decision on the case in ques-
tion or has sent notification as provided by the first sub-
paragraph of Article 5(3) of this Regulation.
Article 8
Liaison with the authorities of the Member States
1. The Commission shall carry out the procedures pro-
vided for in this Regulation in close and constant liaison
with the competent authorities of the Member States;
these authorities shall have the right to express their views
on such procedures.
2. The Commission shall immediately forward to the
competent authorities of the Member States copies of the
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complaints and applications and of the most important
documents sent to it or which it sends out in the course of
such procedures.
3. An Advisory Committee on Agreements and Domi-
nant Positions in Air Transport shall be consulted prior to
the taking of any decision following upon a procedure
under Article 3 or of any decision under the second sub-
paragraph of Article 5(3), or under the second subpara-
graph of paragraph 4 of the same Article or under Article
6. The Advisory Committee shall also be consulted prior
to adoption of the implementing provisions provided for
in Article 19.
4. The Advisory Committee shall be composed of offi-
cials competent in the sphere of air transport and agree-
ments and dominant positions. Each Member State shall
nominate two officials to represent it, each of whom may
be replaced, in the event of his being prevented from at-
tending, by another official.
5. Consultation shall take place at a joint meeting con-
vened by the Commission; such a meeting shall be held
not earlier than fourteen days after dispatch of the notice
convening it. In respect of each case to be examined, this
notice shall be accompanied by a summary of the case,
together with an indication of the most important docu-
ments, and a preliminary draft decision.
6. The Advisory Committee may deliver an opinion
notwithstanding that some of its members or their alter-
nates are not present. A report of the outcome of the
consultative proceedings shall be annexed to the draft de-
cision. It shall not be made public.
Article 9
Requests for information
1. In carrying out the duties assigned to it by this Regu-
lation, the Commission may obtain all necessary informa-
tion from the Governments and competent authorities of
the Member States and from undertakings and associa-
tions of undertakings.
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2. When sending a request for information to an under-
taking or association of undertakings, the Commission
shall forward a copy of the request at the same time to the
competent authority of the Member State in whose terri-
tory the head office of the undertaking or association of
undertakings is situated.
3. In its request, the Commission shall state the legal ba-
sis and purpose of the request and also the penalties for
supplying incorrect information provided for in Article
12(1)(b).
4. The owners of the undertakings or their representa-
tives and, in the case of legal persons or of companies,
firms or associations having no legal personality, the per-
son authorized to represent them by law or by their rules
shall be bound to supply the information requested.
5. When an undertaking or association of undertakings
does not supply the information requested within the time
limit fixed by the Commission, or supplies incomplete in-
formation, the Commission shall by decision require the
information to be supplied. The decision shall specify
what information is required, fix an appropriate time limit
within which it is to be supplied and indicate the penalties
provided for in Article 12(1)(b) and Article 13(1)(c), as
well as the right to have the decision reviewed by the
Court of Justice.
6. At the same time the Commission shall send a copy of
its decision to the competent authority of the Member
State in whose territory the head office of the undertaking
or association of undertakings is situated.
Article 10
Investigations by the authorities of the Member States
1. At the request of the Commission, the competent au-
thorities of the Member States shall undertake the investi-
gations which the Commission considers to be necessary
under Article 11 (1) or which it has ordered by decision
adopted pursuant to Article 11(3). The officials of the
competent authorities of the Member States responsible
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for conducting these investigations shall exercise their
powers upon production of an authorization in writing is-
sued by the competent authority of the Member State in
whose territory the investigation is to be made. Such an
authorization shall specify the subject matter and purpose
of the investigation.
2. If so requested by the Commission or by the compe-
tent authority of the Member State in whose territory the
investigation is to be made, Commission officials may as-
sist the officials of the competent authority in carrying out
their duties.
Article 11
Investigating powers of the Commission
1. In carrying out the duties assigned to it by this Regu-
lation, the Commission may undertake all necessary inves-
tigations into undertakings and associations of
undertakings. To this end the officials authorized by the
Commission shall be empowered:
(a) to examine the books and other business records;
(b) to take copies of, or extracts from, the books and
business records;
(c) to ask for oral explanations on the spot;
(d) to enter any premises, land and vehicles used by un-
dertakings or associations of undertakings.
2. The authorized officials of the Commission shall exer-
cise their powers upon production of an authorization in
writing specifying the subject matter and purpose of the
investigation and the penalties provided for in Article
12(1)(c) in cases where production of the required books
or other business records is incomplete. In good time
before the investigation, the Commission shall inform the
competent authority of the Member State in whose terri-
tory the same is to be made of the investigation and the
identity of the authorized officials.
3. Undertakings and associations of undertakings shall
submit to investigations ordered by decision of the Com-
mission. The decision shall specify the subject matter and
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purpose of the investigation, appoint the date on which it
is to begin and indicate the penalties provided for in Arti-
cles 12(1)(c) and 13(l)(d) and the right to have the deci-
sion reviewed by the Court of Justice.
4. The Commission shall take the decisions mentioned
in paragraph 3 after consultation with the competent au-
thority of the Member State in whose territory the investi-
gation is to be made.
5. Officials of the competent authority of the Member
State in whose territory the investigation is to be made
may assist the Commission officials in carrying out their
duties, at the request of such authority or of the
Commission.
6. Where an undertaking opposes an investigation or-
dered pursuant to this Article, the Member State con-
cerned shall afford the necessary assistance to the officials
authorized by the Commission to enable them to make
their investigation. To this end, Member States shall take
the necessary measures after consultation of the Commis-
sion by 31 July 1989. &
Article 12
Fines
1. The Commission may, by decision, impose fines on
undertakings or associations of undertakings of from 100
to 5000 ECU where, intentionally or negligently:
(a) they supply incorrect or misleading information in
connection with an application pursuant to Article
3(2) or Article 5; or
(b) they supply incorrect information in response to a
request made pursuant to Article 9(3) or (5), or do
not supply information within the time limit fixed by
a decision adopted under Article 9(5); or
(c) they produce the required books or other business
records in incomplete form during investigations
under Article 10 or Article 11, or refuse to submit to
an investigation ordered by decision taken pursuant
to Article 11(3).
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2. The Commission may, by decision, impose fines on
undertakings or associations of undertakings of from
1000 to 1,000,000 ECU, or a sum in excess thereof but
not exceeding 10% of the turnover in the preceding busi-
ness year of the undertakings participating in the infringe-
ment, where either intentionally or negligently they:
(a) infringe Article 85(1) or Article 86 of the Treaty; or
(b) commit a breach of any obligation imposed pursuant
to Article 6(1) of this Regulation.
In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had both
to the gravity and to the duration of the infringement.
3. Article 8 shall apply.
4. Decisions taken pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 shall
not be of a penal nature.
5. The fines provided for in paragraph 2(a) shall not be
imposed in respect of acts taking place after notification
to the Commission and before its decision in application
of Article 85(3) of the Treaty, provided they fall within the
limits of the activity described in the notification.
However, this provision shall not have effect where the
Commission has informed the undertakings or associa-
tions of undertakings concerned that, after preliminary
examination, it is of the opinion that Article 85(1) of the




1. By decision, the Commission may impose periodic
penalty payments on undertakings or associations of un-
dertakings of from 50 to 1000 ECU per day, calculated
from the date appointed by the decision, in order to com-
pel them:
(a) to put an end to an infringement of Article 85(1) or
Article 86 of the Treaty the termination of which has
been ordered pursuant to Article 4 of this
Regulation;
(b) to refrain from any act prohibited under Article 6(3);
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(c) to supply complete and correct information which
has been requested by decision taken pursuant to Ar-
ticle 9(5);
(d) to submit to an investigation which has been ordered
by decision taken pursuant to Article 11(3).
2. When the undertakings or associations of undertak-
ings have satisfied the obligation which it was the purpose
of the periodic penalty payment to enforce, the Commis-
sion may fix the total amount of the periodic penalty pay-
ment at a lower figure than that which would result from
the original decision.
3. Article 8 shall apply.
Article 14
Review by the Court of Justice
The Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction
within the meaning of Article 172 of the Treaty to review
decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or pe-
riodic penalty payment; it may cancel, reduce or increase
the fine or periodic penalty payment imposed.
Article 15
Unit of account
For the purpose of applying Articles 12 to 14, the ECU
shall be [that] adopted in drawing up the budget of the
Community in accordance with Articles 207 and 209 of
the Treaty.
Article 16
Hearing of the parties and of third persons
1. Before refusing the certificate mentioned in Article
3(2), or taking decisions as provided for in Articles 4, 5(3)
second subparagraph and 5(4), 6(3), 12 and 13, the Com-
mission shall give the undertakings or associations of un-
dertakings concerned the opportunity of being heard on
the matters to which the Commission takes, or has taken,
objection.
2. If the Commission or the competent authorities of the
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Member States consider it necessary, they may also hear
other natural or legal persons. Applications by such per-
sons to be heard shall be granted when they show a suffi-
cient interest.
3. When the Commission intends to take a decision pur-
suant to Article 85(3) of the Treaty, it shall publish a sum-
mary of the relevant agreement, decision or concerted
practice in the Official Journal of the European Communities
and invite all interested third parties to submit their ob-
servations within a period, not being less than one month,
which it shall fix. Publication shall have regard to the le-




1. Information acquired as a result of the application of
Articles 9 to 11 shall be used only for the purpose of the
relevant request or investigation.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 16 and
18, the Commission and the competent authorities of the
Member States, their officials and other servants shall not
disclose information of a kind covered by the obligation
of professional secrecy and which has been acquired by
them as a result of the application of this Regulation.
3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not pre-
vent publication of general information or of surveys
which do not contain information relating to particular
undertakings or associations of undertakings.
Article 18
Publication of decisions
1. The Commission shall publish the decisions which it
adopts pursuant to Articles 3(2), 4, 5(3) second subpara-
graph, 5(4) and 6(3).
2. The publication shall state the names of the parties
and the main contents of the decision; it shall have regard
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to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection
of their business secrets.
Article 19
Implementing provisions
The Commission shall have the power to adopt imple-
menting provisions concerning the form, content and
other details of complaints pursuant to Article 3, applica-
tions pursuant to Articles 3(2) and 5 and the hearings pro-
vided for in Article 16(1) and (2).
Article 20
Entry into force
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January 1988.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and di-
rectly applicable in all Member States.




List Referred to in Article 2
(a) the introduction or uniform application of
mandatory or recommended technical standards for
aircraft, aircraft parts, equipment and aircraft
supplies, where such standards are set by an
organisation normally accorded international
recognition, or by an aircraft or equipment
manufacturer;
(b) the introduction or uniform application of technical
standards for fixed installations for aircraft, where
such standards are set by an organisation normally
accorded international recognition;
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(c) the exchange, leasing, pooling, or maintenance of
aircraft, aircraft parts, equipment or fixed
installations for the purpose of operating air
services and the joint purchase of aircraft parts,
provided that such arrangements are made on a
non-discriminatory basis;
(d) the introduction, operation and maintenance of
technical communication networks, provided that
such arrangements are made on a non-
discriminatory basis;
(e) the exchange, pooling or training of personnel for
technical or operational purposes;
(f) the organisation and execution of substitute
transport operations for passengers, mail and
baggage, in the event of breakdown/delay of
aircraft, either under charter or by provision of
substitute aircraft under contractual arrangements;
(g) the organisation and execution of successive or
supplementary air transport operations, and the
fixing and application of inclusive rates and
conditions for such operations;
(h) the consolidation of individual consignments;
(i) the establishment or application of uniform rules
concerning the structure and the conditions
governing the application of transport tariffs,
provided that such rules do not directly or indirectly
fix transport fares and conditions;
(j) arrangements as to the sale, endorsement and
acceptance of tickets between air carriers
(interlining) as well as the refund, prorating and
accounting schemes established for such purposes;
(k) the clearing and settling of accounts between air
carriers by means of a clearing house, including
such services as may be necessary or incidental
thereto; the clearing and settling of accounts
between air carriers and their appointed agents by
means of a centralised and automated settlement
plan or system, including such services as may be
necessary or incidental thereto.
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APPENDIX B
COUNCIL REGULATION ON THE APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE 85(3) OF THE ROME TREATY
(GROUP EXEMPTIONS)
COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 3976/87 of
14 December 1987 on the application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain
categories of agreements and
concerted practices in the air transport sector
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community and in particular Article 87
thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission' ,
Having regard to the Opinions of the European
Parliament 2,
Having regard to the Opinions of the Economic and So-
cial Committee 3,
Whereas Council Regulation (EEC) No 3975/871 lays
down the procedure for the application of the rules on
competition to undertakings in the air transport sector;
whereas Regulation No 17 of the Council 5 lays down the
procedure for the application of these rules to agree-
ments, decisions and concerted practices other than those
directly relating to the provision of air transport services;
Whereas Article 85(1) of the Treaty may be declared inap-
plicable to certain categories of agreements, decisions and
concerted practices which fulfil the conditions contained
in Article 85(3);
Whereas common provisions for the application of Article
85(3) should be adopted by way of Regulation pursuant to
1 OJ No C 182, 9.7.1984, p. 3.
2 OJ No C 262, 14.10.1985, p. 44; OJ No C 190, 20.7.1987, p. 182 and OJ No C
345, 21.12.1987.
-, OJ No C 303, 25.11.1985, p. 31 and OJ No C 333, 29.12.1986, p. 27.
See page 1 of this Official Journal.
OJ No 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204/62.
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Article 87; whereas, according to Article 87(2)(b), such a
Regulation must lay down detailed rules for the applica-
tion of Article 85(3), taking into account the need to en-
sure effective supervision, on the one hand, and to
simplify administration to the greatest possible extent, on
the other; whereas, according to Article 87(2)(d), such a
Regulation is required to define the respective functions
of the Commission and of the Court of Justice;
Whereas the air transport sector has to date been gov-
erned by a network of international agreements, bilateral
agreements between States and bilateral and multilateral
agreements between air carriers; whereas the changes re-
quired to this international regulatory system to ensure
increased competition should be effected gradually so as
to provide time for the air transport sector to adapt;
Whereas the Commission should be enabled for this rea-
son to declare by way of Regulation that the provisions of
Article 85(1) do not apply to certain categories of agree-
ments between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices;
Whereas it should be laid down under what specific condi-
tions and in what circumstances the Commission may ex-
ercise such powers in close and constant liaison with the
competent authorities of the Member States;
Whereas it is desirable, in particular, that block exemp-
tions be granted for certain categories of agreements, de-
cisions and concerted practices; whereas these
exemptions should be granted for a limited period during
which air carriers can adapt to a more competitive envi-
ronment; whereas the Commission, in close liaison with
the Member States, should be able to define precisely the
scope of these exemptions and the conditions attached to
them;
Whereas there can be no exemption if the conditions set
out in Article 85(3) are not satisfied; whereas the Commis-
sion should therefore have power to take the appropriate
measures where an agreement proves to have effects in-
compatible with Article 85(3); whereas the Commission
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should consequently be able first to address recommenda-
tions to the parties and then to take decisions;
Whereas this Regulation does not prejudge the applica-
tion of Article 90 of the Treaty;
Whereas the Heads of State and Government, at their
meeting in June 1986, agreed that the internal market in
air transport should be completed by 1992 in pursuance
of Community actions leading to the strengthening of its
economic and social cohesion; whereas the provisions of
this Regulation, together with those of Council Directive
87/601/EEC of 14 December 1987 on fares for scheduled
air services between Member States6 and those of Council
Decision 87/602/EEC of 14 December 1987 on the shar-
ing of passenger capacity between air carriers on sched-
uled air services between Member States and on access
for air carriers to scheduled air service routes between
Member States 7, are a first step in this direction and the
Council will therefore, in order to meet the objective set
by the Heads of State and Government, adopt further
measures of liberalization at the end of a three year initial
period,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
This Regulation shall apply to international air transport
between Community airports.
Article 2
1. Without prejudice to the application of Regulation
(EEC) No 3975/87 and in accordance with Article 85(3)
of the Treaty, the Commission may by regulation declare
that Article 85(1) shall not apply to certain categories of
agreements between undertakings, decisions of associa-
tions of undertakings and concerted practices.
2. The Commission may, in particular adopt such regu-
,! See p. 12 of this Official Journal.
7 See p. 19 of this Official Journal.
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lations in respect of agreements, decisions or concerted
practices which have as their object any of the following:
- joint planning and co-ordination of the capacity to be
provided on scheduled air services, insofar as it helps to
ensure a spread of services at the less busy times of the
day or during less busy periods or on less busy routes, so
long as any partner may withdraw without penalty from
such agreements, decisions or concerted practices, and is
not required to give more than three months' notice of its
intention not to participate in such joint planning and co-
ordination for future seasons;
- sharing of revenue from scheduled air services, so
long as the transfer does not exceed 1% of the poolable
revenue earned on a particular route by the transferring
partner, no costs are shared or accepted by the transfer-
ring partner and the transfer is made in compensation for
the loss incurred by the receiving partner in scheduling
flights at less busy times of the day or during less busy
periods;
- consultations for common preparation of proposals
on tariffs, fares and conditions for the carriage of passen-
gers and baggage on scheduled services, on condition that
consultations on this matter are voluntary, that air carriers
will not be bound by their results and that the Commis-
sion and the Member States whose air carriers are con-
cerned may participate as observers in any such
consultations;
- slot allocation at airports and airport scheduling, on
condition that the air carriers concerned shall be entitled
to participate in such arrangements, that the national and
multilateral procedures for such arrangements are trans-
parent and that they take into account any constraints and
distribution rules defined by national or international au-
thorities and any rights which air carriers may have histori-
cally acquired;
- common purchase, development and operation of
computer reservation systems relating to timetabling, res-
ervations and ticketing by air transport undertakings, on
condition that air carriers of Member States have access to
such systems on equal terms, that participating carriers
have their services listed on a non-discriminatory basis
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and also that any participant may withdraw from the sys-
tem on giving reasonable notice;
- technical and operational ground handling at air-
ports, such as aircraft push back, refuelling, cleaning and
security;
- handling of passengers, mail, freight and baggage at
airports;
- services for the provision of in-flight catering.
3. Without prejudice to paragraph 2, such Commission
regulations shall define the categories of agreements, de-
cisions or concerted practices to which they apply and
shall specify in particular:
(a) the restrictions or clauses which may, or may not, ap-
pear in the agreements, decisions and concerted
practices;
(b) the clauses which must be contained in the agree-
ments, decisions and concerted practices, or any
other conditions which must be satisfied.
Article 3
Any regulation adopted by the Commission pursuant to
Article 2 shall expire on 31 January 1991.
Article 4
Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 2 shall include a
provision that they apply with retroactive effect to agree-
ments, decisions and concerted practices which were in
existence at the date of the entry into force of such
Regulations.
Article 5
Before adopting a regulation, the Commission shall pub-
lish a draft thereof and invite all persons and organiza-
tions concerned to submit their comments within such
reasonable time limit, being not less than one month, as
the Commission shall fix.
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Article 6
The Commission shall consult the Advisory Committee
on Agreements and Dominant Positions in Air Transport
established by Article 8(3) of Regulation (EEC) No
3975/87 before publishing a draft regulation and before
adopting a regulation.
Article 7
1. Where the persons concerned are in breach of a con-
dition or obligation which attaches to an exemption
granted by a regulation adopted pursuant to Article 2, the
Commission may, in order to put an end to such a breach:
- address recommendations to the persons concerned;
and
- in the event of failure by such persons to observe
those recommendations, and depending on the gravity of
the breach concerned, adopt a decision that either prohib-
its them from carrying out, or requires them to perform,
specific acts or, while withdrawing the benefit of the block
exemption which they enjoyed, grants them an individual
exemption in accordance with Article 4(2) of Regulation
(EEC) No 3975/87 or withdraws the benefit of the block
exemption which they enjoyed.
2. Where the Commission, either on its own initiative or
at the request of a Member State or of natural or legal
persons claiming a legitimate interest, finds that in any
particular case an agreement, decision or concerted prac-
tice to which a block exemption granted by a regulation
adopted pursuant to Article 2(2) applies nevertheless has
effects which are incompatible with Article 85(3) or are
prohibited by Article 86, it may withdraw the benefit of
the block exemption from those agreements, decisions or
concerted practices and take, pursuant to Article 13 of
Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87, all appropriate measures
for the purpose of bringing these infringements to an
end.
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3. Before taking a decision under paragraph 2, the Com-
mission may address recommendations for termination of
the infringement to the persons concerned.
Article 8
The Council shall decide on the revision of this Regula-
tion by 30 June 1990 on the basis of a Commission propo-
sal to be submitted by 1 November 1989.
Article 9
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January 1988.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and di-
rectly applicable in all Member States,
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APPENDIX C
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE ON SCHEDULED AIR FARES
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 14 December 1987
on fares for scheduled air services between
Member States
(87/601/87)
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community, and in particular Articles 84(2)
and 227(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission' ,
Having regard to the Opinions of the European
Parliament2 ,
Having regard to the Opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee3 ,
Whereas more flexible procedures for approving sched-
uled passenger air fares for air services between Member
States will give air carriers greater scope to develop mar-
kets and better meet consumer needs;
Whereas air carriers should be encouraged to control
their costs, increase productivity and provide efficient and
attractively priced air services;
Whereas common rules should be established laying
down criteria for the approval of air fares;
Whereas, by virtue of Article 189 of the Treaty, Member
States may choose the most appropriate means of imple-
menting the provisions of the Directive, and in particular
may apply the criteria laid down in Article 3 more
precisely;
Whereas procedures should be established for the sub-
mission by air carriers of proposed air fares and their ex-
press or automatic approval by the Member States
concerned; whereas air carriers should be free to propose
OJ No C 78, 30.3.1982, p. 6
2 OJ No C 322, 28.11.1983, p. 10 and OJ No C 345, 21.12.1987.
OJ No C 77, 21.3.1983, p. 26.
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air fares individually or after consultation with other air
carriers for the purpose, in particular, of fixing the terms
of interlining agreements, given the important benefits
which they confer;
Whereas provision should be made for rapid consultation
between Member States in the case of any disagreement
and for procedures for settling such disagreements re-
garding approval of fares as are not resolved by
consultations;
Whereas provision should be made for the regular consul-
tation of consumer groups on matters relating to air fares;
Whereas the Heads of State and Government, at their
meeting in June 1986, agreed that the internal market in
air transport should be completed by 1992 in pursuance
of Community actions leading to the strengthening of its
economic and social cohesion; whereas the provisions of
this Directive on fares are a first step in this direction and
the Council will therefore, in order to meet the objective
set by the Heads of State and Government, adopt further
measures of liberalization in respect of air fares at the end
of a three year initial period,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
Article 1
This Directive shall apply to criteria and procedures to be
applied with respect to the establishment of scheduled air
fares charged on any route between an airport in one
Member State and an airport in another Member State.
This Directive shall not apply to the overseas departments
referred to in Article 227(2) of the Treaty.
Article 2
For the purposes of this Directive:
(a) scheduled air fares means the prices to be paid in the
applicable national currency for the carriage of pas-
sengers and baggage on scheduled air services and
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the conditions under which those prices apply, in-
cluding remuneration and conditions offered to
agency and other auxiliary services;
(b) zone of flexibility means a pricing zone as referred to
in Article 5, within which air fares meeting the condi-
tions in Annex II qualify for automatic approval by
the aeronautical authorities of the Member States.
The limits of a zone are expressed as percentages of
the reference fare;
(c) reference fare means the normal economy air fare
charged by a third- or fourth-freedom air carrier on
the routes in question; if more than one such fare ex-
ists, the average level shall be taken unless otherwise
bilaterally agreed; where there is no normal economy
fare, the lowest fully flexible fare shall be taken;
(d) air carrier means an air transport enterprise with a
valid operating licence to operate scheduled air
services;
(e) a third-freedom air carrier means an air carrier hav-
ing the right to put down, in the territory of another
State, passengers, freight and mail taken up in the
State in which it is registered;
a fourth-freedom air carrier means an air carrier hav-
ing the right to take on, in another State, passengers,
freight and mail for off-loading in its State of
registration;
a fifth-freedom air carrier means an air carrier having
the right to undertake the commercial air transport
of passengers, freight and mail between two States
other than its State of registration;
(f) Community air carrier means:
(i) an air carrier which has its central administra-
tion and principal place of business in the
Community, the majority of whose shares are
owned by nationals of Member States and/or
Member States and which is effectively con-
trolled by such persons or States, or
(ii) an air carrier which, although it does not meet
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the definition set out in (i), at the time of adop-
tion of this Directive:
A. either has its central administration and
principal place of business in the Commu-
nity and has been providing scheduled or
non-scheduled air services in the Commu-
nity during the 12 months prior to adop-
tion of this Directive,
B. or has been providing scheduled services
between Member States on the basis of the
third- and fourth-freedoms of the air dur-
ing the 12 months prior to adoption of this
Directive.
The enterprises which meet the above criteria are
listed in Annex I;
(g) States concerned mean the Member States between
which the scheduled air service in question is
operated;
(h) scheduled air service means a series of flights each
possessing all the following characteristics:
(i) it passes through the air space over the terri-
tory of more than one Member State;
(ii) it is performed by aircraft for the transport of
passengers or passengers and cargo and/or
mail for remuneration, in such a manner that
on each flight seats are available for purchase
by members of the public (either directly from
the air carrier or from its authorized agents);
(iii) it is operated so as to serve traffic between the
same two or more points, either
1) according to a published timetable, or
2) with flights so regular or frequent that they
constitute a recognisably systematic series;
(i) flight means a departure from a specified airport to-
wards a specified destination.
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CRITERIA
Article 3
Without prejudice to Article 5(2), Member States shall ap-
prove air fares if they are reasonably related to the long-
term fully allocated costs of the applicant air carrier, while
taking into account other relevant factors. In this connec-
tion, they shall consider the needs of consumers, the need
for a satisfactory return on capital, the competitive market
situation, including the fares of the other air carriers oper-
ating on the route, and the need to prevent dumping.
However, the fact that a proposed air fare is lower than
that offered by another air carrier operating on the route
shall not be sufficient reason for withholding approval.
PROCEDURES
Article 4
1. Air fares shall be subject to approval by the aeronauti-
cal authorities of the States concerned. To this end, an air
carrier shall submit its fares in the forms prescribed by
those authorities.
This shall be done either:
(a) individually, or
(b) following consultations with other air carriers, pro-
vided that such consultations comply with the re-
quirements of regulations issued pursuant to
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 of 14 Decem-
ber 1987 on the application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty to certain categories of agreements and con-
certed practices in the air transport sector.4
Aeronautical authorities shall not require air carriers to
submit their fares for approval more than 60 days before
they come into effect.
2. Subject to Article 5, and without prejudice to Article
6, fares shall require approval by both the States con-
cerned. If neither of the aeronautical authorities has ex-
4 See p. 9 of this Official Journal.
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pressed disapproval within 30 days of the date of
submission of a fare, it shall be considered as approved.
3. An air fare, once approved, shall remain in force until
it expires or is replaced. It may however be prolonged
after its original date of expiry for a period not exceeding
12 months.
4. A Member State shall permit an air carrier of another
Member State operating a direct or indirect scheduled air
service, on giving due notice, to match an air fair already
approved between the same city pairs. This provision
shall not apply to indirect services which exceed the
length of the shortest direct service by more than 20%.
5. Only third- and fourth-freedom air carriers shall be
permitted to act as price leaders.
Article 5
1. There shall be two zones of flexibility on any sched-
uled air service as follows:
- a discount zone which shall extend from 90% to
more than 65% of the reference fare;
- a deep-discount zone which shall extend from 65% to
45% of the reference fare:
2. Within zones of flexibility, the States concerned shall
permit third- or fourth-freedom air carriers to charge dis-
count and deep-discount air fares of their own choice sub-
ject to the respective conditions set out in Annex II and
provided those air fares have been filed with the States
concerned at least 21 days prior to the proposed date for
their entry into force.
3. If a fare which has been, or is, approved under the
bilateral approval regime and which, as far as its condi-
tions are concerned, qualifies for automatic approval in
the deep-discount zone, is below the floor of that zone,
there shall be additional flexibility as to the level of that
fare. Such additional flexibility shall extend from 10%
below the bilaterally approved level of that fare to the
ceiling of the deep-discount zone.
A fare which is entitled to additional flexibility in accord-
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ance with this paragraph shall be renewed in successive
fare seasons at the request of the air carrier concerned at
a level not lower than the percentage of the reference fare
at which it stood at the end of the previous fare season,
any change in level of the reference fare being duly taken
into account. For the purpose of this paragraph, summer
and winter fare seasons shall be treated separately.
Article 6
This Directive shall not prevent Member States from con-
cluding arrangements which are more flexible than the
provisions of Articles 4 and 5 or from maintaining such
arrangements in force.
Article 7
1. When a State concerned (the first State) decides, in
conformity with the above Articles, not to approve a
scheduled air fare, it shall inform the other State con-
cerned (the second State) in writing within 21 days of the
fare being filed, stating its reasons.
2. If the second State disagrees with the decision of the
first State, it shall so notify the first State within seven
days of being informed, providing the information on
which its decision is based, and request consultations.
Each State shall supply all relevant information requested
by the other. Either of the States concerned may request
that the Commission be represented at the consultations.
3. If the first State has insufficient information to reach a
decision on the fare, it may request the second State to
enter into consultations before the expiry of the 21-day
period prescribed in paragraph 1.
4. Consultations shall be completed within 21 days of
being requested. If disagreement still persists at the end
of this period, the matter shall be put to arbitration at the
request of either of the States concerned. The two States
concerned may agree to prolong the consultations or to
proceed directly to arbitration without consultations.
5. Arbitration shall be carried out by a panel of three
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arbitrators unless the States concerned agree on a single
arbitrator. The States concerned shall each nominate one
member of the panel and seek to agree on the third mem-
ber (who shall be a national of a third Member State and
act as panel chairman). Alternatively they may nominate a
single arbitrator. The appointment of the panel shall be
completed within seven days. A panel's decisions shall be
reached by a majority of votes.
6. In the event of failure by either State concerned to
nominate a member of the panel or to agree on the ap-
pointment of a third member, the Council shall be in-
formed forthwith and its President shall complete the
panel within three days. In the event of the Presidency
being held by a Member State which is party to the dis-
pute, the President of the Council shall invite the Govern-
ment of the next Member State due to hold the
Presidency and not party to the dispute to complete the
panel.
7. The arbitration shall be completed within a period of
21 days of completion of the panel or nomination of the
single arbitrator. The States concerned may, however,
agree to extend this period. The Commission shall have
the right to attend as an observer. The arbitrators shall
make clear the extent to which the award is based on the
criteria in Article 3.
8. The arbitration award shall be notified immediately to
the Commission.
Within a period of 10 days, the Commission shall confirm
the award, unless the arbitrators have not respected the
criteria set out in Article 3 or the procedure laid down by
the Directive or the award does not comply with Commu-
nity law in other respects.
In the absence of any decision within this period, the
award shall be regarded as confirmed by the Commission.
An award confirmed by the Commission shall become
binding on the States concerned.
9. During the consultation and arbitration procedure,
the relevant existing air fares shall be continued in force
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At least once a year, the Commission shall consult on air
fares and related matters with representatives of air trans-
port user organizations in the Community, for which pur-
pose the Commission shall supply appropriate
information to the participants.
Article 9
1. By 1 November 1989, the Commission shall publish a
report on the application of this Directive, which shall in-
clude statistical information on the cases in which Article
7 has been invoked.
2. Member States and the Commission shall co-operate
in the application of this Directive, particularly as regards
the collection of the information referred to in paragraph
1.
3. Confidential information obtained in application of
this Directive shall be covered by professional secrecy.
Article 10
Where a Member State has concluded an agreement with
one or more non-member countries which gives fifth-free-
dom rights for a route between Member States to an air
carrier of a non-member country, and in this respect con-
tains provisions which are incompatible with this Direc-
tive, the Member State shall, at the first opportunity, take
all appropriate steps to eliminate such incompatibilities.
Until such time as the incompatibilities have been elimi-
nated, this Directive shall not affect the rights and obliga-
tions vis-a-vis non-member countries arising from such an
agreement.
Article 11
1. After consultation with the Commission, the Member
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States shall take the necessary steps to comply with this
Directive by 31 December 1987.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission
all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions
which they adopt for the application of this Directive.
Article 12
The Council shall decide on the revision of this Directive
by 30 June 1990, on the basis of a Commission proposal
to be submitted by 1 November 1989.
Article 13
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.





AIRLINES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE (2)(f)(ii)
The following airlines meet the criteria referred to in Arti-
cle 2(0)(ii) as long as they are recognized as a national car-
rier by the Member State which so recognizes them at the
time of the adoption of this Directive:
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ANNEX H
CONDITIONS FOR DISCOUNT AND DEEP-DISCOUNT
FARES
DISCOUNT ZONE
1. To qualify for the discount zone all of the following
conditions must be met:
(a) round or circle trip;
(b) maximum stay of six months; and either
(c) minimum stay of not less than Saturday night or
six nights or
(d) if off-peak (as defined in the Appendix) advance
purchase of not fewer than 14 days; reservation for
the entire trip, ticketing and payment to be made
at the same time; cancellation or change of reser-
vation only available prior to departure of out-
bound travel and at a fee of at least 20% of the
price of the ticket.
DEEP-DISCO UNT ZONE
2. To qualify for the deep-discount zone, a fare must
meet:
- either conditions 1(a), (b) and (c) and one of the fol-
lowing conditions:
(a) reservation for the entire trip, ticketing and pay-
ment to be made at the same time; cancellation or
change of reservation only available prior to de-
parture of outbound travel and at a fee of at least
20% of the price of the ticket;
(b) mandatory advance purchase of not fewer than 14
days; reservation for the entire trip, ticketing and
payment to be made at the same time; cancellation
or change of reservation only available prior to de-
parture of outbound travel and at a fee of at least
20% of the price of the ticket;
(c) purchase of the ticket only permitted on the day
prior to departure of outbound travel; reservation
[53
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to be made separately for both the outbound and
inbound journeys and only in the country of de-
parture on the day prior to travel on the respective
journeys;
(d) passenger to be aged not more than 25 years or
not less than 60 years;
- or, if off-peak (as defined in the Appendix), conditions
l(a) and (b) together with:
- either condition 2(b) and one of the following
conditions:
(e) passenger to be aged not more than 25 years or
not less than 60 years;
(f) father and/or mother with children aged not more
than 25 years travelling together (minimum 3
persons);
(g) 6 or more persons travelling together with cross-
referenced tickets;
or
(h) mandatory advance purchase of not fewer than 28
days; reservation for the entire trip, ticketing and
payment to be made at the same time; cancellation
or change of reservation only available:
- if more than 28 days before outbound travel,
at a fee of at least 20% of the price of the ticket, or
- if fewer than 28 days before outbound travel,
at a fee of at least 50% of the price of the ticket.
APPENDIX
Definition of "off-peak"
An air carrier may designate certain flights as "off-peak"
on the basis of commercial considerations.
When an air carrier wishes to use condition 1 (d) or any of
conditions 2(e) to (h), identification of the off-peak flights
for each route shall be agreed between the aeronautical
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authorities of the Member States concerned on the basis
of the proposal made by that air carrier.
On each route where the total activity of third- and
fourth-freedom air carriers reaches a weekly average of 18
return flights, the air carriers concerned shall be allowed
as a minimum to apply conditions 1 (d) or 2(e) to (h) on up
to 50% of its total daily flights, provided that the flights to
which these conditions may be applied depart between
10.00 and 16.00 or between 21.00 and 06.00.
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APPENDIX D
COUNCIL DECISION ON CAPACITY SHARING AND
MARKET ACCESS
COUNCIL DECISION
of 14 December 1987
on the sharing of passenger capacity between
air carriers on scheduled air services
between Member States and access
for air carriers to scheduled service routes
between Member States
(87/602/87)
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community, and in particular Articles 84(2)
and 227(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,'
Having regard to the Opinions of the European
Parliament,2
Having regard to the Opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee,3
Whereas flexibility and competition in the Community air
transport system should be increased;
Whereas the artificial constraints imposed on the capacity
which air carriers may provide and on their access to the
market should therefore be relaxed;
Whereas, taking into account the competitive market situ-
ation, provision should be made to prevent unjustifiable
economic effects on air carriers; whereas Member States
should accordingly be able to intervene if the capacity
share of their carriers in a bilateral relationship would
otherwise fall below a given percentage;
Whereas increased market access will stimulate the devel-
opment of the Community air transport sector and give
I OJ No C 182, 9.7.1984, p. 1.
OJ No C 262, 14.10.1985, p. 44, and OJ No C 345, 21.12.1987.
OJ No C 303, 25.11.1985, p. 31.
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rise to improved services for users; whereas, however, in
order to prevent undue disturbance of existing air traffic
systems and to allow time for adaptation, it is appropriate
to provide for some limitations on market access;
Whereas it is necessary to ensure that such limitations do
not give an unfair advantage to any one air carrier;
Whereas it is necessary, in order to achieve a balanced set
of opportunities, and taking account of the provisions of
the measures as a whole, to redress the economic disad-
vantages of air carriers established in the peripheral Mem-
ber States of the Community;
Whereas it is necessary, in particular, not to apply the
opening of routes between hub airports of one State and
regional airports of another State to a certain number of
airports for reasons relating to airport infrastructure and
in order to secure a gradual development of the Commu-
nity policy of liberalization avoiding negative effects on
the Community air transport system;
Whereas arrangements for greater cooperation over the
use of Gibraltar airport were agreed in London on 2 De-
cember 1987 by the Kingdom of Spain and the United
Kingdom in ajoint declaration by the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of the two countries, and such arrangements have
yet to come into operation;
Whereas air carriers should be free from any State obliga-
tion to enter into agreements with other air carriers in re-
spects of capacity and market access;
Whereas the Heads of State and Government, at their
meeting in June 1986, agreed that the internal market in
air transport should be completed by 1992 in pursuance
of Community actions leading to the strengthening of its
economic and social cohesion; whereas the provisions of
this Decision on capacity sharing and market access are a
first step in this direction and the Council will therefore,
in order to meet the objective set by the Heads of State
and Government, adopt further measures of liberalization
in respect of capacity sharing and market access including
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new fifth-freedom traffic rights between Community air-
ports at the end of a three year initial period,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
Article 1
1. This Decision concerns:
(a) the sharing of passenger capacity between the air
carrier(s) of one Member State and the air carrier(s)
of another Member State on scheduled air services
between these States;
(b) access for Community air carrier(s) to certain routes
between Member States which they do not already
operate.
2. This Decision shall not affect the relationship be-
tween a Member State and its own air carriers respecting
capacity sharing and market access.
3. This Decision shall not apply to the overseas depart-
ments referred to in Article 227(2) of the Treaty.
4. Articles 3 and 4 shall not apply to those services sub-
ject to Council Directive 83/416/EEC of 25 July 1983
concerning the authorization of scheduled inter-regional
air services for the transport of passengers, mail and
cargo between Member States,4 as amended by Directive
86/216/EEC.5
5. The application of this Decision to the airport of Gi-
braltar is understood to be without prejudice to the re-
spective legal positions of the Kingdom of Spain and the
United Kingdom with regard to the dispute over sover-
eignty over the territory in which the airport is situated.
6. Application of the provisions of this Decision to Gi-
braltar airport shall be suspended until the arrangements
in the joint declaration made by the Foreign Ministers of
the Kingdom of Spain and the United Kingdom on 2 De-
4 OJ No L 237, 26.8.1983, p. 19.
.0J No L 152, 6.6.1986, p. 47.
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cember 1987 have come into operation. The Govern-
ments of Spain and the United Kingdom will so inform
the Council on that date.
Article 2
For the Purpose of this Decision:
(a) capacity shall be expressed as the number of seats
offered to the general public on a scheduled air ser-
vice over a given period;
(b) capacity share means the share of the air carrier(s) of
a Member State expressed as a percentage of the to-
tal capacity in a bilateral relationship with another
Member State, excluding any capacity provided
under the provisions of Article 6(3) or under the
terms of Directive 83/416/EEC and also any capacity
provided by a fifth-freedom air carrier:
(c) air carrier means an air transport enterprise with a
valid operating license to operate scheduled air
services;
(d) a third-freedom air carrier means an air carrier hav-
ing the right to put down, in the territory of another
State, passengers, freight and mail taken up in the
State in which it is registered;
a fourth-freedom air carrier means an air carrier hav-
ing the right to take on, in another State, passengers,
freight and mail, for off-loading in its State of
registration;
a fifth-freedom air carrier means an air carrier having
the right to undertake the commercial air transport
of passengers, freight and mail between two States
other than its State of registration;
(e) States concerned mean the Member States between
which the scheduled air service in question is
operated;
(f) Community air carrier means
(i) an air carrier which has its central administra-
tion and principal place of business in the
Community, the majority of whose shares are
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owned by nationals of Member States and/or
Member States and which is effectively con-
trolled by such persons or States, or
(ii) an air carrier which, although it does not meet
the definition set out in (i) at the time of adop-
tion of this Decision:
A. either has its central administration and
principal place of business in the Commu-
nity and has been providing scheduled or
non-scheduled air services in the Commu-
nity during the 12 months prior to adop-
tion of this Decision;
B. or has been providing scheduled services
between Member States on the basis of the
third and fourth freedoms of the air dur-
ing the 12 months prior to adoption of this
Decision.
The enterprises which meet the above criteria are listed in
Annex I.
(g) scheduled air service means a series of flights each
possessing all the following characteristics:
(i) it passes through the air space over the terri-
tory of more than one Member State;
(ii) it is performed by aircraft for the transport of
passengers or passengers and cargo and/or
mail for remuneration, in such a manner that
on each flight seats are available for purchase
by members of the public (either directly from
the air carrier or from its authorized agents);
(iii) it is operated so as to serve traffic between the
same two or more points, either
(1) according to a published time-table, or
(2) with flights so regular or frequent that
they constitute a recognizably systematic
series;
(h) flight means a departure from a specified airport to-
wards a specified destination;
(i) multiple designation on a country-pair basis means
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the designation by one Member State of two or more
of its air carriers to operate scheduled air services
between its territory and that of another Member
State;
(j) multiple designation on a city-pair basis means the
designation by one Member State of two or more of
its air carriers to operate a scheduled air service be-
tween an airport or airport system in its territory and
an airport or airport system in the territory of an-
other Member State;
(k) hub airport means an airport included in the list in
Annex II as a category 1 airport; regional airport
means a category 2 or 3 airport as listed in Annex II;
(1) airport system means two or more airports grouped
together as serving the same city.
SHARES OF CAPACITY
Article 3
1. In the period between 1 January 1988 and 30 Septem-
ber 1989, a Member State shall allow any third- and
fourth-freedom air carriers(s) authorized by the States
concerned under the arrangements in force between them
to operate routes between their territories to adjust ca-
pacity provided that the resulting capacity shares are not
outside the range 55%:45%.
2. Unless a different decision is taken under Article 4,
the range within which a Member State shall allow the air
carrier(s) of another Member State to increase its (their)
capacity share shall be extended to 60:40% from 1 Octo-
ber 1989.
3. In applying the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, uni-
lateral cut-backs in capacity shall not be taken into ac-
count. In such cases, the basis for the calculation of
capacity shares shall be the capacity offered in the previ-
ous corresponding seasons by the air carrier(s) of the
Member State which has (have) reduced its (their)
capacity.
4. Adjustments within the 55%:45% range or the
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60%:40% range, as appropriate, shall be permissible in
any given season, under the following conditions:
(a) after the first automatic approval, the air carrier(s) of
the Member State offering less capacity shall be au-
thorized to increase its (their) own capacity up to the
limit of the capacity approved for the air carrier(s) of
the Member State offering the larger capacity;
(b) if the latter air carrier(s) choose(s) to react to the
above mentioned increase, it (they) shall receive au-
tomatic approval for one further increase, up the
level of its (their) first capacity filing(s) for that sea-
son, within the applicable range;
(c) the carrier(s) of the Member State offering less ca-
pacity will then receive automatic approval for one
increase up to the matching level;
(d) any further increases during that season shall be sub-
ject to the applicable bilateral provisions between
the two Member States concerned.
Article 4
1. At the request of any Member State for which the ap-
plication of Article 3(1) has led to serious financial dam-
age for its air carrier(s), the Commission will carry out a
review before 1 August 1989 and, on the basis of all rele-
vant factors, including the market situation, the financial
position of the carrier(s) and the capacity utilisation
achieved, will take a decision on whether the provisions of
Article 3(2) should be applied in full or not.
2. The Commission shall communicate its decision to
the Council which, acting by unanimity, may take a differ-




1. A Member State shall accept multiple designation on
a country-pair basis by another Member State but, subject
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to paragraph 2, shall not be obliged to accept the designa-
tion of more than one air carrier on any one route.
2. A Member State shall also accept multiple designa-
tion on a city-pair basis by another Member State:
- in the first year after the notification of this Decision,
on routes on which more than 250,000 passengers were
carried in the preceding year;
- in the second year, on routes on which more than
200,000 passengers were carried in the preceding year or
on which there are more than 1200 return flights per
annum;
- in the third year, on routes on which more than
180,000 passengers were carried in the preceding year or
on which there are more than 1000 return flights per
annum.
3. The provisions of this Article are subject to those in
Articles 3 and 4.
ROUTES BETWEEN HUB AND
REGIONAL AIRPORTS
Article 6
1. Subject to the provisions of Articles 3, 4 and 5, Com-
munity air carriers shall be permitted to introduce third or
fourth freedom scheduled air services between category 1
airports or airport systems in the territory of one Member
State and regional airports in the territory of another
Member State. Airport categories are listed in Annex II.
2. (i) The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply:
(a) to regional airports exempted from the pro-
visions of Directive 83/416/EEC;
(b) for the duration of this Decision to:
- the following airports which, at the time of
notification of this Decision, handle fewer
than 100,000 passengers per annum on in-









- the following airports or airport systems
which at the time of the notification of this





(ii) In addition, in order to prevent major distur-
bance of existing air traffic systems and to allow
time for adaptation, the following airports shall
also be excluded from the provisions of para-





3. Articles 3 and 4 shall not apply to services between an
airport in category 1 and a regional airport which are pro-
vided by aircraft with not more than 70 passenger seats.
4. Where an air carrier of one Member State has been
authorized in accordance with this Article to operate a
scheduled air service, the State of registration of that air
carrier shall raise no objection to an application for the
introduction of a scheduled air service on the same route
by an air carrier of the other State concerned.
5. The provisions of this Article shall not affect a Mem-
ber State's right to regulate the distribution of traffic be-
tween the airports within an airport system.
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COMBINA TION OF POINTS
Article 7
1. In operating scheduled air services to or from two or
more points in another Member State or States, a third-
or fourth- freedom Community air carrier shall, subject to
the provisions of Articles 3, 4 and 5, be permitted to com-
bine scheduled air services, provided that no traffic rights
are exercised between the combined points.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply within
Spanish territory during the period of validity of this deci-
sion. Similarly, air carriers registered in Spain may not
avail themselves of those provisions during that period.
FIFTH-FREEDOM RIGHTS
Article 8
1. Without prejudice to Article 6(2), a Community air
carrier shall be permitted to operate a fifth-freedom
scheduled air service where third- or fourth-freedom traf-
fic rights exist, provided that the service meets the follow-
ing conditions:
(a) it is authorized by the State of registration of the
Community air carrier concerned;
(b) it is operated as an extension of a service from, or as
a preliminary of a service to, its State of registration;
(c) without prejudice to paragraph 2, it is operated be-
tween two airports at least one of which is not a cate-
gory 1 airport; and
(d) not more than 30% of the carrier's annual capacity
on the route concerned may be used for the carriage
of fifth-freedom passengers.
2. Subject to paragraphs 1(a), (b) and (d), Ireland and
Portugal may each select one category 1 airport in each of
the other Member States and may each designate an air
carrier to carry fifth-freedom traffic on services between
those airports, provided that neither of the air carriers so
designated may exercise such rights at any one airport on
more than one such route. The Member States concerned
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need not designate the same carrier for all routes but may
for this purpose designate only one carrier to each other
Member State.
3. This Article shall not apply during the period of valid-
ity of this Decision to routes to or from Spanish territory.
Similarly, during the same period air carriers registered in
Spain may not claim fifth-freedom rights on the basis of
the provisions in this Article.
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 9
Notwithstanding Articles 5 to 8, a Member State shall not
be obliged to authorize a scheduled air service in cases
where:
(a) the airport concerned in that State has insufficient fa-
cilities to accommodate the service;
(b) navigational aids are insufficient to accommodate the
service.
Article 10
1. This Decision shall not prevent Member States from
concluding arrangements which are more flexible than
the provisions of this Decision or from maintaining such
arrangements in force.
2. The provisions of this Decision shall not be used to
make existing capacity or market access arrangements
more restrictive.
Article 11
Member States shall not require air carriers to enter into
agreements or arrangements with other air carriers relat-
ing to any of the provisions of this Decision, nor shall they
forbid them to do so.
Article 12
1. After consultation with the Commission, Member
1988] 733
734 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
States shall take the necessary steps to comply with this
Decision not later than 31 December 1987.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission
all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions
which they adopt for the application of this Decision.
Article 13
1. Before 1 November 1989, and every two years there-
after, the Commission shall publish a report on the imple-
mentation of this Decision.
2. Member States and the Commission shall cooperate
in implementing this Decision, particularly as regards col-
lection of information for the report referred to in para-
graph 1.
3. Confidential information obtained within the frame-
work of the implementation of this Decision shall be cov-
ered by professional secrecy.
Article 14
The Council shall decide on the revision of this Decision
by 30 June 1990 at the latest, on the basis of a Commis-
sion proposal to be submitted by 1 November 1989.
Article 15
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.






AIR CARRIERS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 2(f)(ii)
The following air carriers meet the criteria referred to in
Article 2(f)(ii) as long as they are recognized as national
carriers by the Member State which so recognizes them at
the time of the adoption of this Decision:




























































Category 3 All other airports officially open to international
scheduled services.;
